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ABSTRACT
Absolute Pacifism (or AP) is the thesis that no act of assault is morally permissible. This
entails that all acts of self-defensive assault are impermissible. This essay defends AP against
non-eliminativist theories of justified self-defensive assault – that is, theories of self-defensive
assault which, contrary to AP, claim that at least some instances of self-defensive assault are
morally permissible. Chapter 1 begins by defining assault and AP and subsequently exploring a
species of AP wedded to the Doctrine of Double Effect (or DDE). Chapter 2 defends AP against
the thesis that self-defensive assault is morally permissible but not morally obligatory. Against
this, it is argued that there can be no mere right to self-defensive assault since that right would
render permissible causing unnecessary harm. Chapter 3 defends AP against the thesis that selfdefensive assault is not only morally permissible but also morally obligatory. Against this, it is
argued that there can be no duty to engage in self-defensive assault because there is a
trivializability constraint which makes the existence of those duties impossible. Since if there are
permissible instances of self-defensive assault they are either mere rights or duties, and since
there are no instances of either, it follows that there are no instances of permissible self-defensive
assault.
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This thesis is dedicated to the late Soran Reader (1963-2012), whose defense of pacifism
motivated me to reconsider my own views. I came to defend a fuller peace, as she did, and I wish
I could have told her so. Rest in peace.
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CHAPTER 1:
Theories of Self-Defense

1. Introduction
Nearly everyone believes that there is a right to self-defense. What persons mean by this
and why they believe as they do admits of considerable variation. But there is popular and
widespread agreement that persons have a right to defend themselves in some robust sense. This
confidence is readily apparent when others are asked what they believe about ‘pacifism’: even
without a formal definition of the view, it is often immediately rejected on the grounds that it
disallows what is allowed: self-defense.
But does pacifism disallow self-defense and, if it does, what kind of self-defense does it
disallow? Moreover, why does it disallow self-defense of some kind (if it does)? The purpose of
this chapter, and the following chapters, is to clarify what pacifism is and defend it against
objections claiming a certain supposed self-defensive right: the right to self-defensive assault.
2. Self-Defensive Assault
The focus of this essay is self-defense. But what is self-defense? Consider the following
cases.
WRESTLER is engaged in a competitive match against matched talented Opponent. When
forced into a headlock by Opponent, Wrestler defends herself against Opponent and pins
Opponent for the required time, effectively winning the difficult match and emerging a
state champion.
DEFENDANT is sued by Plaintiff on charges of fraud, and Defendant acts as his own
attorney and defends himself in court against Plaintiff.
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COMBATANT is deployed to Nazi-occupied France. His plane is shot down and he is
forced to survive in enemy territory, occasionally defending himself against German
ground troops.
Each of these cases – Wrestler, Defendant, and Combatant – is, in a general sense, a case
of self-defense. Wrestler defends herself against Opponent; Defendant defends himself against
Plaintiff; and Combatant defends himself against German ground troops. But these defenders do
not defend themselves against identical threats, and do not use identical means to avert those
threats. The threat to Wrestler is losing a state championship. For Defendant, the threat is a fine
or perhaps imprisonment (or both). For Combatant, the threat is injury (minor or serious),
tortured interrogation, and death. The means of the actors likewise differ: physical force
(Wrestler), legal procedures (Defendant), and assault or attempted assault (Combatant).
This essay will address self-defensive assault. The limits are important to the scope of the
following chapters and therefore to determining their success, as will become clear. The purpose
of this section is to identify precisely what makes self-defensive assault the sort of act that
requires justification if it is to be done permissibly. In this respect, self-defensive assault differs
from (for example) drinking orange juice in the morning. The consumption of orange juice is
prima facie not an act with some moral presumption against it. But assault, even self-defensive
assault, is prima facie an act of that sort. The discussion has not yet been restricted to more
specific cases of self-defensive assault (for example, assault against unjustified threats or
proportional assault). It is fairly uncontroversial that not all self-defensive assault is justified,
since justified self-defensive assault must meet multiple conditions. Thus, it should also be
uncontroversial that there is a moral presumption against unqualified self-defensive assault.
Some hold that in order to identify what makes assault morally problematic (where it is
so), it is necessary to make a distinction between consensual and nonconsensual self-defensive
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assault. Self-defensive assault is nonconsensual if and only if the person assaulted does not
consent to being assaulted. Providing greater content, let us say that Assaulted does not consent
to being assaulted by Assaulter if and only if the following condition holds: were Assaulted to be
given the (non-coercive) option to be assaulted by Assaulter in the present circumstance,
Assaulted would not accept that offer.1 Consensual assault, by contrast, includes all and only
cases in which Assaulted would accept Assaulter’s offer to be assaulted by Assaulter.
What results are entailed by this account of consent? First, ordinary combatants and
ordinary professional boxers do not consent to being assaulted in self-defense, since they would
not accept offers of assault from their opponents. We might say that combatants and boxers do
not, merely in virtue of being combatants or boxers, consent to being assaulted in the respective
ways. This is a controversial judgment in the ethics of war, however, as McMahan makes clear:
But it has been argued that what makes all combatants legitimate targets for their military
adversaries, independently of whether they have a just cause, is that in one way or
another they consent to be targets in exchange for the privilege of making other
combatants their own targets.2
Indeed, McMahan explicitly compares Michael Walzer’s view of warfare to a boxing
match:
According to the first of Walzer’s suggestions, war is analogous to a boxing match or a
duel. Just as it is a part of the profession of boxing to consent to be hit by one’s
opponents, so it is part of the profession of arms to consent to be attacked by one’s
adversaries.3
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It is not strictly necessary for consent that the offer is not turned down. If a waitress offers you
the special and you fail to turn it down (say, within a millisecond), it would hardly follow that
she is justified in charging you for the special. Thus, consent requires more than merely failing to
reject something.
2
McMahan (2011), 51.
3
McMahan (2011), 52.
3

As McMahan observes, however, the boxing analogy appears poorly suited as an analogy
of just warfare. While combatants risk harm to themselves, they do not thereby consent to that
harm being done to them. McMahan offers an analogy in which a person “voluntarily walks
through a dangerous neighborhood late at night” and effectively “assumes or accepts a risk of
being mugged, but he does not consent to be mugged in the sense of waiving his right not to be
mugged.”4 Consider another analogy in which a person accepts a certain risk of harm, even a
very high risk of harm, but does not consent to that harm.
PATIENT must undergo open-heart surgery to avoid certain health problems. The chances
of Patient surviving this surgery are incredibly low: ten percent. He knows this. He signs
a medical waiver to demonstrate his recognition that the odds are against him, and that it
is not Doctor’s fault if Patient dies. Mid-surgery, Patient awakens to discover Doctor
holding his beating heart. Doctor informs Patient that since Patient consented to the risks,
Doctor can now permissibly stop Patient’s heart. Doctor then stabs the heart and kills
Patient.
Two things appear clear in this case. First, Doctor wronged Patient by killing him.
Second, Patient would not have been wronged if Patient forfeited his right not to be killed by
consenting to the surgery. But then Patient’s acceptance of the surgical risks did not entail
consenting to the foreseen harm. Likewise, combatants do not forfeit their right not to be harmed
simply by engaging in an activity like warfare, which carries with it certain risks of harm.
There are ways to respond to both the Patient example and McMahan’s Neighborhood
example. For example, perhaps Patient effectively consents to being killed as a result of natural
(or, because Doctor is involved, ‘standardly expected’) causes foreseen by the surgery, but does
not thereby consent to Doctor killing Patient for no legitimate medical reason. Thus, while
Patient consents to being killed by Doctor accidentally as a result of risky but cautiously-made
surgical procedures designed to assist Patient, Patient does not consent to being killed by Doctor
4

McMahan (2011), 52.
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intentionally as a result of procedures designed to kill Patient. Killing Patient in the latter way
would, in warfare, be analogous to killing combatants during a temporary ceasefire in which
negotiations are held. Combatants do not consent to die in those circumstances, but it might be
maintained that they do consent to die in ordinary circumstances of warfare: battles, skirmishes,
and the like.
For present purposes, it is unimportant to take sides on whether self-defensive assault in
warfare is consensual or nonconsensual. As an account of why self-defensive assault is pro tanto
wrong, however, the consensual/nonconsensual distinction is merely designed to show that what
might make self-defensive assault pro tanto wrong is that it includes harming others who do not
consent to being harmed.5 Certainly that does seem wrong. But there is a deeper explanation for
why self-defensive assault is pro tanto wrong. Consider the following cases.
INJURED is rushed to the emergency room with an arrow in his shoulder. The attending
physician realizes that the arrow can and should be removed safely, and does so, causing
great pain to Injured.
TORTURED has a bad character, and Torturer knows this. Torturer captures Tortured and
inflicts sometimes considerable and sometimes minor harm on Tortured to improve the
character of Tortured.
PROFESSOR assigns a grade of “Fail” to Student, effectively ruining Student’s day.
ESCAPEE must hit Kidnapper over the head with a baseball bat to escape a dungeon.
Consent generates puzzles for assault. Injured is harmed but consents to the harm and the
harm is crucial to preserving the wellbeing of Injured’s organism. This intuitively makes Injured
not a victim of assault. Tortured is gravely harmed ‘for his own good,’ but even supposing the
harm does incentivize Tortured to turn his life around and even if Tortured does consent to the
grievous harm, it still appears as though Torturer assaults Tortured. If talk of consent can be
5

The view that combatants consent to be harmed in warfare is defended by Thomas Hurka,
among others. See Hurka (2007). Cf. Walzer (2006), 25-29, 163-169.
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clarified in the right way, an account of assault can be developed in which the important pieces
are preserved without the added complication of consent. Thus:
Defender assaults Threat at time t only if and because:
(i)
Defender intentionally and directly causes a state of affairs C;
(ii)
prior to C, a fully-informed Threat would have had conclusive prudential
reason to escape C (absent some other C-type circumstance if Threat
succeeded in escaping C) if Threat aimed to protect Threat’s organism;
and
(iii) Threat does not escape C.
On this account, several essential features of assault are present. The first is
intentionality. Any unintentional harm is not assault; there can be no accidental assault. Assault
is therefore purposeful, intentional.

The second is directness. If Defender hires Assassin to kill Threat, then Defender does
not assault Threat. At most, Defender intends for Threat to be assaulted. Thus, assault requires
causal directness. There are degrees and kinds of directness, however, but the directness
condition is designed primarily to exclude as instances of assault cases in which some agent (qua
agent) distinct from Defender harms Threat.

Threat is fully-informed. Consider a case in which, prior to C, Threat has conclusive
prudential reason to escape C, but this conclusive prudential reason is grounded in some
misleading epistemic consideration: Defender aims a gun at Threat but Defender does not intend
to fire. This would hardly constitute assault. Thus, Threat must (again, prior to C) have
conclusive prudential reason to escape C, where this conclusive prudential consideration holds
on the assumption that Threat is fully-informed.
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The circumstance, C, must itself be counterfactually sufficient to motivate conclusive
prudential reason to avoid C.6 Consider a case in which Threat attempts to escape C (say, by
running out the back door of the pub) but, when attempting to escape, finds himself in another Ctype circumstance (say, there is a violent gang outside ready to mutilate him). Staying in the bar
and being shot in the leg might, from the standpoint of Threat’s organism, be prudentially better
than attempting to escape being shot in the leg.7 Still, this would not make shooting Threat in the
leg a case of non-assault. Circumstance C is one for which Threat has conclusive prudential
reason to escape absent some alternate C-type circumstance.
Escaping C must be for the sake of Threat’s organism. Someone might have conclusive
prudential reason to move their car from the train tracks because, otherwise, someone else will
intentionally and directly smash it to bits. But this would not be assaulting Threat because it is
not an act against Threat’s organism, even if it might have causal effects for Threat’s organism.

Finally, that which Threat has conclusive prudential reason to avoid must happen. After
all, Threat might have conclusive prudential reason to avoid C (where C is shooting Threat in the
leg); there might be no other pressing C-type circumstance (no gang outside); and still Threat

6

Thus, all acts of assault are pro tanto wrong because they give persons conclusive prudential
reason to flee for the sake of their organisms. Whether consent makes a difference to whether an
act is an act of assault is not entirely clear. Sometimes, where a person consents to assault and it
is best for that person’s organism to die (as is sometimes the case in euthanasia – see footnote 7
below), it might be that it is not a case of assault. Other times, where a person consents to assault
and it is not best for that person’s organism to be injured or die, conclusive prudential reason
remains for the person to flee since the intended act goes against what is best for the person.
7
Perhaps this is why consensual euthanasia does not seem to be a case of assault. If it is in the
person’s best interest to die and if the person consents, it seems to many that killing the person
(or, on passive variations, intentionally letting the person die) is compassionate and hardly an
instance of providing prudential reason to avoid C. Where it is best for the person’s organism not
to escape but rather to die, it is not an act of assault to kill him (or, on passive variations, to
intentionally let him die).
7

might escape C. Upon doing so, Threat would have avoided assault while meeting the other
conditions. Thus, the prior conditions are not sufficient for assault. It is necessary that Threat fail
to escape C for the account to be completed.

A final word about the purpose of this essay: this essay will address only those cases of
self-defense which do not extend to other moral considerations. This omits cases in which agents
assault threats in order to protect others (other-defense), to prevent catastrophe or other evils, for
purposes of punishment, and the like. Thus, the essay is limited in its focus to cases of selfdefensive assault: assaulting for the mere purpose of protecting oneself.8
3. Theories of Self-Defense
What are the currently-endorsed theories of self-defensive assault? More to the point:
what are the theories of self-defensive assault with implications regarding whether and under
what conditions self-defensive assault is justified? These theories come in two broad categories:
eliminativist theories and non-eliminativist theories. Eliminativist theories entail that there are no
instances of justified self-defense, whereas non-eliminativist theories entail that there are such
cases.
Tyler Doggett has categorized the more significant non-eliminativist theories of justified
self-defensive assault.9 Though there is wide agreement that self-defensive assault can be
justified, there is, by contrast, “little agreement about why you can kill” and when “you can kill

8

Other cases will be discussed and utilized for illustration, but they will not be the focus of the
essay.
9
Doggett (2011). Special thanks to Tom Dougherty at the University of Sydney for bringing this
paper to my attention.
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in self-defense.”10 Because this essay concerns whether self-defensive assault is justified, both
kinds of theses (‘why’ and ‘when’ theses) are relevant. A restatement of the non-eliminativist
theories would be largely redundant to Doggett’s masterful summary, however, and therefore a
restatement will be passed over. Instead, an eliminativist theory of justified self-defensive assault
will be explicated. As eliminativist theories are omitted in Doggett’s literature review, this
should serve as a helpful addendum and is more immediately relevant to a defense of
eliminativism.
Eliminativism is a thesis about justified self-defensive assault, and not self-defensive
assault. There are at least two ways to be this kind of eliminativist. The first is to claim that there
are moral properties which supervene conditionally on natural or non-morally descriptive
properties, like intent and behavior, but that in the actual world there are none of the latter
properties on which moral properties like “Defender being justified in assaulting Threat”
supervene. Thus, self-defensive assault would be justified if certain events obtained, and those
events can obtain, but in fact none of them do obtain. On this eliminativist theory, the argument
is that eliminativism is true in the actual world but not in all possible worlds. Often, this is
considered to be a species of conditional pacifism.11
The second way to be an eliminativist is to claim that there are no moral properties like
“Defender being justified in assaulting Threat,” and therefore self-defensive assault would not be

10
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Doggett (2011), 220. Cf. Frowe (2011), 12-24.
See Fiala (2010).
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morally justified regardless of what turned out to be the case (how persons behaved, what they
intended, etc.).12 Eliminativism of this variety is a species of absolute pacifism.13
4. Absolute Pacifism
Species of absolute pacifism are notoriously difficult to characterize, in part due to
qualms regarding inner coherence. For example, consider the following sketch of absolute
pacifism:
AP:

There is no possible world in which an agent is objectively morally
justified in (intentionally) assaulting a person or intentionally
permitting a person to be assaulted.

One important objection to this view is that given by Narveson, who initiates his
objection with an observation about AP:
To attempt to be consistent, at least, the pacifist is forced to accept the characterization of
him at which we tentatively arrived. He must indeed say that no one ought ever to be
defended against attack. The right to self-defense can be denied coherently only if the
right of defense, in general, is denied.14
But Narveson thinks this opposition to self-defensive and other-defensive assault is selfdefeating because “generally speaking, we measure a man’s degree of opposition to something
by the amount of effort he is willing to put forth against it.”15 When assault is necessary to
preserve peace and the absolute pacifist fails to do what is necessary, she does not truly or
primarily value peace. Narveson recognizes that pacifists might respond in various ways, but

12

The intention is not to assume a realist account of moral properties, but rather to explicate
eliminativism in a way that makes use of a seemingly realist account of moral properties. Talk of
properties here is therefore an illustration of eliminativism and not a commitment of it.
13
Fiala (2010). Cf. McMahan (2010), 44.
14
Narveson (1965), 265
15
Narveson (1965), 265-266.
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each response fails since the right not to be assaulted (which the absolute pacifist grants
everyone, and absolutely so) is, like all rights, “a status justifying preventative action”:
To say that you have a right to X but that no one has any justification whatever for
preventing people from depriving you of it, is self-contradictory. If you claim a right to X,
then to describe some action as an act of depriving you of X, is logically to imply that its
absence is one of those things that you have a right to.16
Such a conception of rights is far too simple, and the proper correction of it clears the
pacifist of this charge.17 There are some acts which are absolutely wrong: boiling young children
for fun, for instance. Another plausible example is boiling young children in order to save
yourself, where everything morally considerable is exhausted in the rights and value you and the
children possess. Even if it is necessary to boil these children to save yourself, you still ought not
to boil them. Boiling them would be wrong, all things considered. Thus, in the circumstance, the
only act of self-defense which stands a chance at success at self-preservation is morally
forbidden. Yet that conclusion does not entail that you lack a right not to be assaulted. Absolute
pacifists can avail themselves of this strategy: all assault, including self-defensive assault, is
absolutely wrong and therefore is not even a possibly permissible means of self-preservation. Of
course, the absolute pacifist must argue for this, but the project of arguing that assault is
absolutely wrong (at least in conjunction with the thesis that persons have the right not to be
assaulted) is not excluded from the realm of logical possibility.
Although Narveson’s objection appears to fail, it succeeds in exposing concerns of
internal consistency for AP. Thomas Nagel articulates a similar objection against absolutist

16

Narveson (1965), 266.
Cf. Rodin (2002), 36-38. Rodin explicitly acknowledges that a claim-right to X is a claim-right
to take measures to protect one’s right to X. Rodin does not, however, suggest that this latter
right is an absolute right. There may be, and plausibly are, restrictions on how agents can
permissibly pursue the protection of their rights.
17
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pacifism, which Nagel describes as “the view that one may not kill another person under any
circumstances, no matter what good would be achieved or evil averted thereby.”18
There could not, for example, without incoherence, be an absolute prohibition against
bringing about the death of an innocent person. For one may find oneself in a situation in
which, no matter what one does, some innocent people will die as a result. I do not mean
just that there are cases in which someone will die no matter what one does, because one
is not in a position to affect the outcome one way or the other. That, it is to be hoped, is
one’s relation to the deaths of most innocent people. I have in mind, rather, a case in
which someone is bound to die, but who it is will depend on what one does.19
Such cases are easily constructed. Modifying the example to concern killing some person,
regardless of innocence (AP, after all, does not only forbid assaulting the innocent), consider the
following case.
TRAPPED. Defender is under attack by Threat, and Threat will kill Defender unless
Defender kills Threat. Defender and Threat know this.
Granting a few other assumptions, there are exactly two possible outcomes: Defender
kills Threat or Threat kills Defender. If Defender decides not to kill Threat, then Threat will kill
Defender. Thus, it appears that, no matter what Defender chooses, she allows or causes the death
of some person. Since ought implies can, Defender does not have an obligation to avoid bringing
about the death of any person because Defender cannot avoid bringing about the death of some
person.
By Nagel’s lights, “[t]his problem is avoided, however, because what absolutism forbids
is doing certain things to people, rather than bringing about certain results.”20 AP, like
absolutism generally, forbids intentionally bringing about absolute wrongs. For AP, the absolute
wrong is assaulting a person. But AP does not forbid doing something which, if one does it,
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Nagel (2013), 56.
Nagel (2013), 59.
20
Nagel (2013), 60.
19
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would lead to the assault of a person.21 Ordinarily, the distinction is made between what one
intends and what one merely foresees.22
How might the distinction be motivated? Various accounts have been proposed, but one
of the most appealing is T.A. Cavanaugh’s account of intention, which he characterizes as a plan
of action.
As a plan of action, intention is something concrete, complex, formed, and – when it
comes to fruition – executed. It is concrete, insofar as it unifies specific elements to form
an aggregate; complex, as comprised of ends (both intermediate and ultimate in a given
series) and means (some of which serve as intermediate ends); formed, as the result of a
process called deliberation; and executed, as the action it informs follows it.23
So construed, it appears that all acts are intentional. If you exit the grocery store, trip, and
drop your prize watermelon, your doing so was not an act. Acts are behaviors agents commit for
reasons, and acting-so-as-to-X just is intending to X.24 Thus, all acts are intentional and all
intentional behaviors are acts. On precisely those grounds a morally relevant distinction can be
reasonably made: what agents do intentionally is morally evaluable; what they do unintentionally
is not.25
Parents of impoverished families who spend the necessary amount to feed their family
but accidentally spill their groceries when exiting the store, effectively ruining the food, do not
act wrongly in spilling the groceries because their grocery-spilling behavior is not an act at all.
21

See Masek (2010). Masek contends that “an effect is intended (or part of the agent’s plan) if
and only if the agent A has the effect as an end or believes that it is a state of affairs in the causal
sequence that will result in A’s end,” 569.
22
For more by way of explicating this distinction, see Hills (2007).
23
Cavanaugh (2006), 94.
24
Or, if acting-so-as-to-X includes some sort of objectionable circularity, behaving-so-as-to-X
can be substituted.
25
Culpable ignorance might be pressed as an exception. But ignorance, it seems, cannot be
genuinely culpable unless an agent intentionally ignores relevant information, or intentionally
refuses to access to information she is aware exists, which can and should be accessed by her. Cf.
Smith (2011).
13

But this behavior, if intended, does constitute a wrong because it is evaluable and is an
objectively bad state of affairs. Bad states of affairs, when intended by agents, become wrongs,
and wrongs should be avoided.
AP requires that agents always avoid intentionally assaulting persons because it classifies
all person-assaulting acts as absolutely wrong. How does abiding by AP work in cases like
Trapped? Where the agent realizes that intending the death of Threat or intending the death of
Defender constitutes assault and is therefore absolutely wrong, the agent can escape wrongdoing
by failing to intend either outcome. Suppose Defender decides not to kill Threat, which results in
Threat killing Defender. If Defender did not refrain from killing Threat with the goal of being
killed by Threat, then Defender did not intend to be killed by Threat. By contrast, if Defender
decided to commit suicide (which AP forbids sometimes, but not always) by means of Threat,
then Defender would refrain from killing Threat so as to be killed by Threat.
Yet the intending/foreseeing distinction could just as easily cut against AP. In fact, there
are double-effect theories of justified self-defensive assault.26 According to the doctrine of
double effect (or DDE), it is permissible to cause an evil effect only if the following conditions
are met:27
Condition 1: the act performed is morally good or morally neutral;
Condition 2: the agent performing the act intends the good effect, but does not intend the
evil effect;
Condition 3: the good effect fails to be caused by the evil effect;
Condition 4: there is sufficiently good reason for causing the evil effect.
Consider the following passage from Helen Frowe:
26
27

See also the sophisticated account of the DDE offered by Jeff McMahan (1994a).
Cavanaugh (2006), 26.
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The double-effect explanation of self-defence, then, insists that it would be wrong to
intend harm to one’s attacker. However, causing harm to the attacker can nonetheless be
permissible provided that it is merely a foreseen side-effect of pursuing the good end of
saving one’s life. In other words, the permissibility of self-defence lies in the fact that the
defender does not aim at doing harm, but aims only at the morally permissible end of
saving their life.28
Judith Lichtenberg observes that, on traditional just war theory, it is absolutely prohibited
to kill innocent persons in warfare. Yet, the DDE permits certain acts which might be
impermissible on AP since, “[a]ccording to the DDE, it is never permissible to kill innocents
directly – that is, one may never aim at or intend their deaths.”29 She continues:
You may kill innocents neither as an end, as you might if you were malicious, nor (the
more likely alternative in war) as a means, as you might if you saw their deaths as a way
of winning the war. But you have not necessarily done something impermissible or
immoral, on this view, if in the course of a legitimate military operation – that is, one
aimed at and intended only to destroy a military target – some civilians are killed, even if
you know or foresee that they will be killed.30
Cavanaugh strikes a similar chord:
Consider terror and tactical bombing. Both bombers want victory as their good and
commit themselves to its achievement, differing in terms of the means they adopt.31
Yet, according to Cavanaugh, an important difference emerges.
The tactical bomber, like the terror bomber, ultimately intends victory. He differs from
the terror bomber insofar as he foresees, but does not intend the foreseen non-combatants
deaths and serious harms that follow with causal necessity from his destruction of the
military installation. This is so, although the killing of the non-combatants may conduce
to victory. For the tactical bomber does not intend to achieve victory by means of noncombatant deaths. His foresight of civilian deaths and injuries does not guide his act; he
does not confirm the presence of the civilians to bomb them.32

28

Frowe (2011), 20.
Lichtenberg (1994), 349. Cf. Hills (2003). Hills defends the DDE in cases of foreseeing but
not intending harm, arguing that the distinction does make a moral difference.
30
Lichtenberg (1994), 349-350.
31
Cavanaugh (2006), 114.
32
Cavanaugh (2006), 116. Cf. FitzPatrick (2012), 183. Like Cavanaugh, FitzPatrick utilizes the
terror bomber/tactical bomber cases as illustrative of the DDE.
29

15

Consider a domestic example of self-defensive assault in which Defender works for the
railroad as a professional detonator. At 3:15pm, it is the job of Defender to detonate the dynamite
on Track Alpha. Moments before Defender detonates the dynamite, Defender sees Threat who,
in addition to intending to kill Defender unjustly, is also making way toward Defender along
Track Alpha. The clock strikes 3:15pm, and Threat is very near the dynamite. Defender does not
intend the death of Threat, but Defender detonates the dynamite, which kills Threat.
An acceptance of the intended/foreseen distinction might therefore be self-defeating for
AP. The apparent dilemma for AP is this: either reject the intended/foreseen distinction,
effectively collapsing into incoherence or denying that ought implies can; or, accept AP and
concede that it can be permissible to intend some act where one consequence of that act is the
assault of some person.33
Fortunately, in this case, the solution lies in the details. On any plausible variation of the
DDE, of which the intended/foreseen distinction is a part, there are restrictions to the permissible
use of that distinction. Consider the following passage, again from Cavanaugh:
Imagine foreseeably but not intentionally killing non-combatants while tactically
bombing an artillery installation. Stipulate that the act satisfies the other criteria. The
evils at issue (the terrorizing and killing of non-combatants) do not outweigh the goods
(ending the lethal threat of the artillery, victory over the unjust enemy, self-preservation,
self-determination). Thus interpreted, the fourth criterion [of DDE] permits such an act.
Yet, what if there were some other, less harmful, way of bombing that would mitigate or
entirely remove the evil? For example, what if different types of bombs, a different time,
or a different approach would lessen or remove the harm?34
In response to this line of inquiry, Cavanaugh responds:

33

Some defenders of AP might avail themselves of this latter option, but this seems a hollow
absolute pacifism. If one can engage in tactical bombing in a way that is consistent with absolute
pacifism, then such a position hardly seems like pacifism.
34
Cavanaugh (2006), 32.
16

Clearly, it would be wrong to cause gratuitous harm. Insofar as the realization that one
ought to avoid evil underlies recourse to double effect, it would be odd, indeed perverse,
to interpret the fourth condition [of DDE] as holding that evil is not to be eliminated or
mitigated, when practically possible.35
Cavanaugh proceeds to point out a domestic parallel in cases of self-defense. On
Aquinas’ view, “the permissible act of homicidal self-defence must be proportionatus fini,
proportioned to the end.”36 Aquinas asserts that persons have a greater obligation to care for their
own lives than the lives of those they kill in just self-defense, which derives from the
requirement that, when acting with a merely foreseen bad effect in order to achieve some good
outcome, “the good must be greater.”37
Defenders of AP might escape this implication by denying that saving oneself, or any
good for that matter, is a good proportionately greater than avoiding killing or assaulting Threat.
After all, an absolute prohibition against assault entails that assaulting is very wrong. But this
begs the question and gets the defender of AP only so far, since it might be that assaulting Threat
is absolutely wrong, in the sense that it is never permissible, and yet still be less wrong than
assaulting oneself. Then, the defender of the intended/foreseen distinction (and perhaps DDE, as
well) might press that it is permissible unintentionally to assault Threat because, although
absolutely wrong as an act, Defender is not assaulting Threat as an act (because Defender does
not intend Threat’s death) and Defender is preserving the greater good (or minimizing the worse
evil): the life of Defender (or, if the worse evil, avoiding the death of Defender).
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Cavanaugh (2006), 33.
Aquinas (1891). Cited in Cavanaugh (2006), 33.
37
Cavanaugh (2006), 34.
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17

A better reply remains available to the defender of AP. Another condition which must be
met in order permissibly to perform an act with a merely foreseen but unintended bad effect is
this: “the act in itself is good or indifferent.”
The first criterion [of DDE], that an act be good or indifferent, rules out the application of
double effect to otherwise bad acts having good and bad effects. For example, Robin
Hood’s intrinsically bad act of stealing has the good effect of relieving the poor and the
bad effect of disconcerting the rich. However, as wrongful taking, it is not a candidate for
[double-effect].38
Thus, if some act is absolutely wrong, it cannot be permissibly done, even if its evil
effects are foreseen but not intended.39 But this provides a foothold for the defender of AP,
insofar as it forbids agents intentionally to permit persons to be assaulted. For double-effect
cases, it works like this: an act is intended; the act has good and evil effects; and the good but not
the evil effects are intended. But even if defenders of DDE deny that the evil effects are
intended, they ought to concede that the act of permitting those effects is intended.40 After all, if
you intend some act knowing that some consequence will result, then (even if you do not intend
the consequence) you intend to permit the consequence by acting. AP rules out the permissibility
of intending such acts, because as a thesis about assault, it forbids not only committing assault,
but also intentionally permitting assault. Thus, it is just as absolutely prohibited (on AP) for
Defender to direct Threat to a room filled with hired guns looking for Threat (but, we shall
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Cavanaugh (2006), 26-27.
Cavanaugh uses “intrinsically” rather than “absolutely,” but surely absolutely wrong acts are
likewise absolutely forbidden. After all, absolutely wrong acts are, by definition, acts that are
always wrong.
40
See Kamm (2007), 91-129. Kamm distinguishes between effects because of which we act and
effects we act in order to bring about. For more on the significance of Kamm’s distinction, see
FitzPatrick (2012), 189-190.
39
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suppose, not because Defender hired the guns41) as it would be for Defender to place a bullet in
Threat’s skull herself.42
What of cases in which Defender is in a case like Trapped, but it does not occur to her
that she can avoid wrongdoing simply by refraining from killing Threat but not intending her
own death? Advocates of AP might insist that Defender acts wrongly if she intends Defender’s
death (or harm) or if she intends Threat’s death (or harm). But this judgment might seem too
harsh for cases in which Defender is unaware that she has an alternative. What motivates the
harshness, however, matters a great deal. It cannot plausibly be harsh to say that it is objectively
wrong not to choose the obligatory act. The DDE itself, like many other moral principles, implies
that agents who perform an absolutely wrong act in non-culpable ignorance nonetheless act
wrongly. What can be plausibly said is that Defender is not blameworthy for choosing the wrong
act.
5. Conclusion
Assault is difficult to define with precision, but a provisional definition is acceptable if
the definition captures paradigmatic cases of assault and avoids paradigmatic cases of nonassault. Such a definition was provided and defended in the beginning of this chapter.

41

If Defender hired the guns to kill Threat then, plausibly, Defender intended to kill Threat (or
have Threat killed).
42
Cavanaugh clarifies the first condition of DDE to be: “the act considered independently of its
bad effect is not wrong” (2006, 27). On the account presented here, however, this presents no
real challenge since, absent the effect, the acts are distinct because the intentions are distinct.
Where an agent intends act X with evil effect Y (while not intending Y), the agent intends to
perform X and intends to permit Y. The intentions change when the agent intends to perform an
act Z without intending to permit Y since, even if Y results, the agent does not intend to permit Y.
Thus, where the effects differ, so do the acts.
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Theories of justified self-defensive assault come in two varieties: eliminativist and noneliminativist theories. These latter theories have been defined, defended, and refined
considerably in the literature. By contrast, eliminativist theories have been largely ignored, in
part because they are notoriously difficult to defend when they are not possessed of internal
logical consistency.
To meet this challenge (not met in the wider literature) a species of eliminativism –
absolute pacifism (AP) – was defined. It was argued that AP is plausible and internally consistent
when it makes use of the intended/foreseen distinction. It was conceded, however, there are
limitations to its use of this distinction and, if the limits are not closely examined, AP collapses.
Nonetheless, plausible restrictions on permissible uses of the intended/foreseen distinction, as
argued, provide various footholds to defenders of AP, allowing AP to maintain internal
coherence.
While the defense of the internal coherence of AP has not been exhaustive (there may be
other challenges to the internal consistency of AP), the major objections to AP’s internal
coherence have been considered and refuted.
Nonetheless, internal coherence is obviously distinct from plausibility: many views
possess internal coherence but fail to possess plausibility. In the next two chapters, AP will be
defended against non-eliminativist theories of justified self-defensive assault. In Chapter 2, AP
will be defended against claims of merely permissible self-defensive assault and, in Chapter 3,
AP will be defended against claims of obligatory self-defensive assault.
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CHAPTER 2:
Against ‘Merely Permissible’ Self-Defense

1. Introduction
The previous chapter sketched the nature of pacifism and included a defense against
problematic implications from the doctrine of double effect (DDE) while simultaneously
utilizing the doctrine’s resources. In this chapter, pacifism stands at a conceptual distance: the
central argument presented here does not entail pacifism; though, if successful, it does offer a
strong response to the particularly worrisome objection that self-defensive assault is sometimes
deontically justified. The argument also does not attempt to sketch pacifism at a conceptual
level: DDE was discussed because pacifism can and probably should make use of it, but making
use of it runs certain risks of tension with the pacifist project. Thus, DDE qua pacifist tool was
explored in the previous chapter, and a particular conceptual combination was defended.
The purpose of this chapter is to argue against a particular thesis of self-defense, namely,
SELF-DEFENSE 1:43

All acts of justified self-defense are (merely) morally
justified.44

To say that all acts of self-defense are merely morally justified is to say that there is a
moral permission but not a moral requirement to act in self-defense. The absence of a moral
requirement to self-defend entails the permissibility of failing to act in self-defense. Thus, on

43

Hereafter, “SD1.”
This account is not strictly implied in the literature discussed below. That literature largely
implies only that some instances of justified self-defensive assault are merely justified. But that
is logically compatible with the existence of obligatory instances of justified self-defensive
assault. As the focus of this essay is to criticize merely justified self-defense, however, this will
be set aside until the following chapter.
44
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SD1, acts of self-defense are what Joel Feinberg terms “half-liberties.”45 It is, however, not an
implication of SD1 that all acts of self-defense are merely permissible and not obligatory
(because SD1 is compatible with morally unjustified acts of self-defense). The claim and the
focus of this chapter is cases of (and opportunities for) permissible but non-obligatory selfdefensive assault.
Widespread acceptance is enjoyed by the thesis that self-defensive assault is sometimes
morally permissible. Thomson says that many “think of self-defense as morally transparent.
What could be clearer than that morality permits a person to save his or her life against threats to
it?”46 She then asks her readers to consider
VILLAINOUS AGGRESSOR: “you are standing in a meadow, innocently minding your own
business, and a truck suddenly heads toward you. You try to sidestep the truck, but it
turns as you turn. Now you can see the driver: he is a man you know has long hated you.
What to do? You cannot outrun the truck. Fortunately, this is not a pure nightmare: you
just happen to have an antitank gun with you, and can blow up the truck. Of course, if
you do this you will kill the driver, but that does not matter: it is morally permissible for
you to blow up the truck, driver and all, in defense of your life.”47
Thomson is explicit that this moral permission is not mere excuse, but that blowing up
the truck (and the driver) is morally permissible, justified killing.48 This is because
…blowing up the truck in Villainous Aggressor is not something you ought not do. We
cannot plausibly say that you ought not blow up the truck, but will only be in a measure
at fault, or in no measure at fault, for doing so: you simply may blow up the truck.
Morality permits it.49
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Feinberg (1980), 157, 237.
Thomson. (1991), 283.
47
Thomson (1991), 283.
48
Thomson’s claim that “it does not matter” if the driver is killed is perhaps best understood as:
it does not matter, all things considered (which is compatible with, but does not entail, the
stronger claim that the death of the driver is morally irrelevant).
49
Thomson (1991), 283-284.
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Cases like Villainous Aggressor are widely regarded as paradigmatic for justified
instances of self-defensive assault. Quong explicitly endorses Thomson’s conclusion about
Villainous Aggressor and other cases Thomson raises, writing, “Like Judith Jarvis Thomson, I
think these are all cases where it is permissible to kill one person in order to save my own life.” 50
Quong is hardly alone in this endorsement. Many philosophers endorse Thomson’s conclusion
about Villainous Aggressor and structurally similar cases, and in their comments suggest
consensus:
Kai Draper:
In these circumstances, few of us would condemn you for killing in self-defense. Nor
would we condemn a third party who intervened on your behalf by killing your
attacker.51
Draper’s talk of condemnation appears to support the view that defenders are in many
cases unworthy of condemnation because they act rightly.
Jan Narveson:
…the simple point is that if somebody else is intent on leaving you dead, and there is
strong immediate evidence that the only really feasible way to prevent this is to leave him
dead first, then normal people prefer the latter to the former.52
Jonathan Quong and Joanna Mary Firth:
It is widely accepted, for example, that if one person, Albert, culpably threatens the life
of another person, Betty, then he may have forfeited his rights against serious harm being
imposed on him in Betty’s defence.53
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Quong (2009), 507.
Draper (1993), 73.
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Narveson (2003), 158. Narveson’s use of “normal people” is suggestive of consensus.
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Quong and Firth (2012b), 674.
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If these judgments about Villainous Aggressor cases are true, then self-defensive assault
is at least sometimes justified.54 Beyond agreement about Villainous Aggressor cases, there is
even broader agreement that self-defense is permissible:
Draper:
I want to explore the nature of what is perhaps the most widely recognized justification
for inflicting harm. Using the term ‘defense’ to encompass both self-defense and otherdefense, I refer to this justification as ‘the appeal to defense.’55
Jeff McMahan:
Most of us believe that there are conditions in which war is justified and thus that there
are conditions in which the individual soldier is morally permitted, and nearly as often
morally required, intentionally to attack and even to kill other human beings. Many
people, indeed, accept this quite uncritically….56
Michael Otsuka:
Many philosophers subscribe to the common belief that you are morally permitted to kill
a person who endangers your life whenever such killing is necessary to prevent yourself
from being killed.57
Quong:
Sometimes it is morally permissible to seriously harm or kill people in self-defense, or in
defense of others.58
Frowe:
When our lives are threatened, most of us think that it is permissible to try to defend
ourselves even if we can do so only by inflicting very great or even lethal harm upon our
attacker.59
54

Draper and Frowe make similar judgments in Draper (1993), 73; and Frowe (2010), 247.
Draper (2009), 69.
56
McMahan (1994c), 193. McMahan goes further than some in suggesting that self-defensive
assault is just as often obligatory as it is merely permissible. Still, McMahan is a clear instance of
a philosopher who endorses the permissibility of self-defensive assault.
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Otsuka (1994), 74.
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Quong (2012), 45.
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Tyler Doggett:
Murderer can’t bear you. Because of this, he tries to push you off a cliff. The only way to
save your life is to shoot – and kill – him. You know all this. You kill him. The literature
on self-defense agrees that killing Murderer in this case, ‘Threat from Murderer’, is
permissible.60
Some philosophers even contend that the permissibility of self-defensive assault in some
cases is either itself obvious or is itself entailed by obviously true moral principles. Among them
are Seth Lazar61, McMahan, and David Rodin:
Defensive rights seem to be entailed in a very basic way by rights to things. Thus if I
have a right to X, then it seems to follow as a simple corollary that I have the right to take
measures to prevent my right to X from being violated.62
McMahan refers to justified self-defense as an axiom in contemporary ethical theory63,
and certainly it appears to enjoy a lofty pedigree. Concurring with McMahan that ordinary
morality includes the possibility of justified self-defensive assault, Lazar claims that self-defense
can remove “the whole wrong in killing a person.”64 This suggestion makes theories of selfdefensive attractive tools for those who believe that war can be justifiably waged. Rodin’s
powerfully simple observation that a right to something entails a right to preserve it supports the
permissibility of self-defensive assault: if one’s right to life is (wrongly) threatened, one is
permitted to exercise one’s right to do what is necessary to protect that right, including in cases
where killing or seriously harming others is necessary to protect one’s right to life.
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Whereas some of these philosophers indicate that self-defensive assault is a duty, most
others fail to indicate whether it is a mere right or a duty. Other philosophers appear, however, to
endorse SD1 (or something very close to SD1):
Rodin:
The difference concerns the question of whether defensive rights are full liberties or halfliberties. It should now be readily apparent that the answer to this question will depend on
their normative source. If a right of defense is derived from a right to the end of defensive
action, then it will generally be a full liberty, in other words, one will be free to defend
the end or not as one sees fit. The reason for this is that rights to things are generally
discretionary.
Rodin concludes: “Thus defense of one’s own life is generally thought to be discretionary
rather than obligatory.”65 Hugo Grotius likewise endorses the view that self-defensive assault is a
right but not a duty when he writes, “[W]hile it is permissible to kill him who is making ready to
kill, yet the man is more worthy of praise who prefers to be killed rather than kill.”66
The former claim, that self-defensive assault is a right but not a duty (that is, a mere
right), is the weaker claim and shall be examined in this chapter. The next chapter examines the
thesis that self-defense is a duty.
2. The Necessity Condition
In addition to wide agreement about self-defensive assault being sometimes justified, it is
also widely agreed that self-defensive assault is not always justified. For self-defensive assault to
be justified, certain conditions must be met. As Frowe observes,
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Rodin (2002), 39. Rodin is clear to make room for the possibility that some self-defensive acts
are obligatory and therefore not merely permissible. However, insofar as he holds that some acts
of self-defense are merely permissible and that the right to self-defense generally derives from
the right to something, Rodin is not far off from accepting SD1.
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Grotius (1925), Book II, chapter 1: 176.
26

…the permission of self-defence is not unlimited. For example, most people think it
permissible to use force only when doing so is necessary. And, most people think that
there are limits to when I can use even necessary force to save my own life.67
The necessity condition for justified self-defensive assault is, like SD1, widely endorsed.
Draper makes mentions of “the usual restrictions on the appeal to defense (necessity,
proportionality and discrimination),”68 and elaborates further on the necessity condition:
An act of defense may also be impermissible if it inflicts more harm than is necessary. It
is usually wrong, for example, to kill an aggressor if you know that you can just as
effectively resist his aggression in disarming him.69
Many other philosophers endorse the necessity condition, even commenting on the
consensus regarding it:
Rodin:
The legal and philosophical literature on self-defense has identified three intrinsic
limitations to the right. These limitations are necessity, imminence, and proportionality. 70
Frowe:
The necessity condition is also a standard requirement of permissible self-defence. This
condition forbids using more force than one has to in the course of defending oneself.71
Lazar has done some of the most significant work regarding the necessity condition, and
he begins by recognizing that “[p]hilosophers generally agree that justified self-defense must
meet four conditions,” the fourth of which is that “the force used [in self-defense] must be
necessary to avert the threat.”72 He continues:
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Frowe (2011), 10. See also 10-12 for discussion of the necessity condition and the
proportionality condition.
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The necessity constraint, however, has been generally neglected. This neglect would be
less troubling if necessity were either immediately perspicuous, or peripheral to the ethics
of self-defense. Unfortunately, closer examination proves the simple, pretheoretical
account of necessity to be inadequate. And if defensive harm can be justified only if it is
necessary, this constraint could hardly be more important. Nor is this only a problem in
self-defense: necessity plays a crucial role in both popular and philosophical thinking
about the ethics of war. We standardly think that, regardless of whether the other criteria
for permissible harm in war are met, unless force is necessary to avert an unjustified
threat, we should refrain.73
Lazar understands the pre-theoretical account of the necessity condition as follows:
Defensive harm H is necessary to avert unjustified threat T if and only if Defender cannot
avert T without inflicting H.74
But Lazar finds this sketch is unsatisfactory, and he considers six other sketches 75 of the
necessity condition before arriving at his own account:
Necessity: Defensive harm H is necessary to avert unjustified threat T if and only if a
reasonable agent with access to the evidence available to Defender would judge that there
is no less harmful alternative, such that the marginal risk of morally weighted harm in H
compared with that in the alternate is not justified by a countervailing marginal reduction
in risked harm to the prospective victims of T.76
Understanding the finer details of Lazar’s analysis is not essential to this paper, but it is
instructive to see just how far beyond the pre-theoretical account it is necessary to venture to
arrive at a satisfactory account of the necessity condition. This might be false if Lazar is wrong
about the pre-theoretical account, but it seems clear that the pre-theoretical account is in need of
considerable refinement.
It will here be argued that standard accounts of the necessity condition, including Lazar’s,
are incomplete. They are incomplete because they fail to specify an important condition relevant
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a right to stand one’s ground.
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to the necessity requirement for justified harm. When the necessity account is adequately
modified, however, the proper account of necessity implies the falsity of SD1.
3. Criticizing the Necessity Condition
SD1 states that any instance of justified self-defensive assault is not morally required but
is instead merely permissible. That implies that every instance of liberty to self-defend is what
Feinberg calls a “full liberty”: one is permitted both to assault and to refrain from assaulting.77
But we might motivate this latter claim – every self-defender is within her rights (that is, is
justified) in foregoing self-defense – independently of simply granting it for the sake of assessing
the implications of SD1. To begin, consider the case of
MONASTIC SACRIFICE, in which Monk opposes all violence, though Monk is not
obligated to oppose any self-defensive violence. Threat attacks Monk and threatens
Monk’s life. While Monk does not wish to die, he does not desire to harm his attacker.
Monk fails to fight back and is killed.
It is plausible that Monk did not act wrongly in failing to defend himself. But then Monk
had no all-things-considered obligation to defend himself, and therefore possessed the right to
forego self-defense. It appears just as plausible to say that there is not, in general, even a pro
tanto duty for Monk to self-defend, since it seems wrongheaded to claim that Monk has a
presumptive duty to self-defend absent countervailing considerations. Similar cases can be
constructed to show that while there may be a pro tanto duty to refrain from assaulting persons,
there is no pro tanto duty against foregoing defensive measures. Recall the suggestions of Hugo
Grotius, who claimed “while it is permissible to kill him who is making ready to kill, yet the man
is more worthy of praise who prefers to be killed rather than to kill”78; and David Rodin, who
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claims that “there may be cases in which the decision not to defend one’s life would be not only
permissible, but a laudable act of supererogation.”79
It appears to be a common view that some harm H should not be inflicted on Threat for
some end E (usually, where E is the preservation of one’s life) if there is some non-harmful way
NH to achieve E. We might express this more formally and generally in the following way:
MEANS SELECTION PRINCIPLE:

Defender is justified in assaulting Threat as
a means to the preservation of some good G
only if there is no (reasonably accessible)
non-assaulting alternative means available to
Defender to preserve G.

This paraphrases the more nuanced accounts Lazar and others give, but it does so in a
way that can be generalized beyond cases of self-defense. What counts for ‘G’ might be
anything80: Defender’s life or well-being, the life or well-being of others, works of art or other
social significance, etc. What the Means Selection Principle entails is this: if there is some
(reasonably accessible) non-assaulting alternative means to preserving G, then (insofar as
Defender intends to preserve G) Defender ought to avail herself of that means (or forego G 81).
This implies Means Selection Necessity:
MS NECESSITY:

Defender’s assaulting Threat as a means to some G
is justified only if there is no (reasonably
accessible) non-assaulting alternate means to
preserving G.

But as it stands, this is incomplete, for it is not only in the case of means that agents
ought to minimize harm, but also in the case of ends. Consider the following examples:
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Rodin (2002), 39.
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GUARDIAN is the legal guardian of Minor. Guardian beats Minor severely with his fists
for no reason at all.
AVENGER was assaulted years ago by Perpetrator. Although Perpetrator no longer poses
a risk to anyone, including Avenger, Avenger has the opportunity to bludgeon Perpetrator
to death while Perpetrator is enjoying a lonely walkabout in the Australian desert.
Avenger takes the opportunity, bludgeoning Perpetrator to death.
Guardian’s selected end, “beating Minor for no reason at all,” is an end for which there is
an absolute moral prohibition. By consequence, Guardian ought not to select that end. Avenger’s
selected end, “bludgeoning Perpetrator to death,” is more fully and better described as
“bludgeoning Perpetrator to death in the pursuit of justice.” Avenger does not randomly select
Perpetrator, after all: Perpetrator, we might suppose, deserves punishment, and it is just that he
receives that punishment.82
In the former case, the locus of Guardian’s wrongdoing is the selection of an absolutely
wrong end. There are other ends that Guardian might permissibly select, ones which are not
absolutely prohibited as ends. In the latter case, Avenger pursues justice (a generally permissible
end) but pursues it in a way that causes more harm than is necessary to achieve justice. For it is
not unjust for Avenger to forego punishing Perpetrator. (This is especially clear if we suppose, as
many do, that all unjust acts are wrong and that Avenger fails to act wrongly in foregoing
punishing Perpetrator. By failing to do wrong, Avenger fails to do anything unjust.) It is
compatible with the demands of justice that Avenger instead adopt the end, “forgive Perpetrator
in the pursuit of justice.” The alternative is to insist that the demands of justice are uniquely
satisfied by bludgeoning Perpetrator. What can be said of that?
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Defenders of AP will deny either that any person deserves assault in any form, including
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Some ends are uniquely realizable: there is only one way, or one kind of way, to realize
that end. Other ends are multiply realizable: there is more than one way, or more than one kind of
way, to realize that end. If the demands of justice are not uniquely met by assault, then cases like
Avenger appear analogous to cases in which Defender pursues the end of self-preservation:
Defender has more than one way to accomplish that end (one involving assault and another not
involving assault), and Defender selects means-by-assault to preserve herself. Such acts are
wrong because they pursue a good and intentionally cause far more harm than is really needed to
achieve that good. Suppose Defender’s end is “saving the entirety of Asia from a nuclear
holocaust" but Defender must make Threat fearful of some bad outcome in one of two ways to
accomplish that end. Either Defender causes early nuclear detonations throughout Threat’s home
country, killing everyone in that country; or, Defender threatens to cause those same early
nuclear detonations. Suppose either end would be effective in saving the entirety of Asia from a
nuclear holocaust. Defender clearly ought to threaten to cause rather than cause nuclear
detonations. The wrongness of doing otherwise is captured fully by MS Necessity.
But what of uniquely realizable ends? Suppose Attacker adopts the end “assault, for no
reason, the first person seen on Main Street every Tuesday.” Suppose on some Tuesday Attacker
comes across Target, the first person Attacker sees on Main Street. Suppose that Attacker was
stopped just prior to attacking Target by Samaritan, who has knowledge of Attacker’s end and
current intention to attack Target. Samaritan points out that assaulting any person for no reason is
wrong, and thus Attacker is not justified in assaulting Target. If Attacker replied that assaulting
Target is the only way to fulfill his end, this would fail to show that Attacker is justified in
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assaulting Threat. Attacker’s end is absolutely prohibited, and thus any means of pursuing it are
likewise prohibited.83
Are there other possible grounds for absolutely prohibiting the pursuit of certain ends?
Consider a case in which Defender Alpha holds the conjunctive end of “self-protection with as
much suffering to Threat as possible.” Defender Beta, by contrast, holds the conjunctive end of
“self-protection with as little suffering to Threat as possible.” Thus, Defender Beta works not
only toward self-protection but also suffering-maximizing self-protection, whereas Defender Beta
works not only toward self-protection but also toward suffering-minimizing self-protection. A
pursuit of the conjunctive end of Defender Alpha appears absolutely wrong, at least where there
is an option instead to adopt the conjunctive end of Defender Beta, for the simple reason that
evils like assault, suffering, and harm ought to be minimized insofar as one can permissibly do
so.84
Return to the case of Avenger and suppose that the end of justice is uniquely
accomplished by bludgeoning Perpetrator. Thus, Defender fails to act justly if Defender foregoes
bludgeoning Perpetrator.85 Yet, if Defender foregoes bludgeoning Perpetrator to pursue some
other end (beneficence, for instance) Defender does not plausibly act wrongly. Thus, Defender is
in this case not obligated to pursue the end of justice, and is permitted to adopt some other end,
such as beneficence. If in this case Defender pursues justice with all that it entails, Defender
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Similar restrictions apply in cases where the ends are cruelty and other absolutely prohibited
ends.
84
Incidentally, intending suffering-maximizing self-protection must entail intending suffering as
an end, for suffering is not intended only insofar as it aids self-protection, but is intended beyond
it.
85
Again, this is assumed for argument, since defenders of AP will deny either that justice
requires any person to be bludgeoned or in any way assaulted, or that justice lacks absolute
priority and beneficence instead trumps justice.
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foregoes beneficence. But then there are two good ends Defender might pursue, justice or
beneficence, and Defender selects an end that involves more harm. But then Defender fails to
minimize harm insofar as she can permissibly do so, which is wrong for the same reason that it is
wrong for Defender Alpha to act as she does.86 These conclusions entail the End Selection
Principle:
END SELECTION PRINCIPLE:

Where Defender assaults Threat as the unique
means of accomplishing end E, Defender justifiably
adopts E only if E is not absolutely wrong to pursue
and E is not a conjunctive-end where one of the
conjuncts is absolutely wrong to intend as an end.

This principle, in turn, implies End Selection Necessity:
ES NECESSITY:

Defender is justified in assaulting Threat as an end
E or assaulting Threat as a means to some end E,
only if E is not absolutely wrong to pursue and E is
not a conjunctive-end where one of the conjuncts is
absolutely wrong to intend as an end.

Plausibly, what goes for means and ends goes likewise for foreseen effects. Consider
some standard cases in which an agent assaults a person, but not intentionally. Consider the
following case from Frowe:
BOMB. A runaway trolley is heading towards you as you lie trapped on the trolley tracks.
You will be killed unless you throw a grenade at the trolley and destroy it. However, the
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One might also say that two conjunctive ends are permissible here: “self-protect and cause
harm” and “practice beneficence and forego causing harm.” Self-protection and practicing
beneficence, however, are ways of preserving or promoting what is morally valuable; both work
toward the end of acting permissibly or living the moral life. Thus, these ends might be
reformulated as follows: “preserve some good G1 and cause harm” and “preserve some good G2
and forego causing harm”; or, “act permissibly/live the moral life and cause harm” or “act
permissibly/live the moral life and forego causing harm.” But the former cases appear clearly
impermissible, since some harm is intended beyond the goal of preserving a good, acting
permissibly, or living the moral life. As in the case of Defender Alpha and Defender Beta,
therefore, assault is intended as its own end.
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blast from the grenade will also kill an innocent person who is lying unconscious by the
side of the tracks.87
If you throw the grenade and destroys the trolley, killing the innocent person nearby, it
might be questioned whether you in fact assaulted the innocent. Nevertheless, it is a case of
killing or harming. Consider another case from T.A. Cavanaugh:

TORPEDO. A torpedo strikes the bow of a submarine and explodes. Water floods the
forward compartments. The submarine begins to sink. The captain commands you to
close the flood-door. You will thereby trap the submariners at the bow in a watery grave.
Yet, if the door remains open, you, the entire crew, and the submarine itself will be lost.88
In Frowe’s case, the act of bomb-throwing is permissible given the foreseen effects only
if there is no reasonably accessible way to avoid killing the innocent. If you could instead roll out
of the way, for example, it would be wrong to throw the bomb. (If you did throw the bomb
regardless, in full recognition that you need not do so to prevent your death, your act would
certainly constitute assaulting the innocent.) In Cavanaugh’s case, the act of watertight-doorclosing is permissible given the foreseen effects only if there is no reasonably accessible way to
avoid killing the innocent. For example, if everyone could be saved by allowing them a further
and harmless eleven seconds to exit the submarine’s bow, it would be wrong to close the
watertight door earlier. Cavanaugh explicitly concedes this:
Clearly, it would be wrong to cause gratuitous harm. Insofar as the realization that one
ought to avoid evil underlies recourse to double effect, it would be odd, indeed perverse,
to interpret the fourth condition [of permissible double-effect] as holding that evil is not
to be eliminated or mitigated, when practically possible.89
Thus, there is a Foreseen-Effects Selection Principle:
F.E. SELECTION PRINCIPLE:

Defender is justified in assaulting Threat as
a foreseen effect of the preservation of some
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Frowe (2011), 21.
Cavanaugh (2006), xiii.
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Cavanaugh (2006), 33.
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good G only if there is no (reasonably
accessible) non-assaulting alternative way
available to Defender to preserve G.
In all double-effect cases, however, foreseen effects are justified (where they are
justified) in virtue of preserving some good. In Bomb, the (rights-based) good of preserving your
life justifies you in performing an act which, if performed, would have bad effects. In Torpedo,
the goods of preserving your life, preserving a greater number of lives, and preserving the
submarine justifies you in closing the watertight door, which kills others. In all cases, some good
functions as the justification for the performance of an act which produces bad effects. As
Cavanaugh puts it, it is “the realization that one ought to avoid evil” which “underlies recourse to
double effect.”90 Thus, if intending to bomb innocents or trap drowning submariners is wrong but
the innocent must be bombed to save one’s life and the submariners must drown to preserve
certain other goods, one can avoid intending these effects by instead intending merely to stop the
trolley with a bomb, recognizing that an innocent will be killed as an effect, and closing the
watertight door, recognizing that innocent submariners will die as a result.
But there is another sense in which one must avoid gratuitous harm. The Doctrine of
Double Effect (hereafter, DDE) is standardly formulated as follows. Producing an evil effect is
justified only if the following conditions are met:91:
Condition 1: the act performed is morally good or morally neutral;
Condition 2: the agent performing the act intends the good effect, but does not intend the
evil effect;
Condition 3: the good effect fails to be caused by the evil effect;
Condition 4: there is sufficiently good reason for causing the evil effect.
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Cavanaugh (2006), 33.
Cavanaugh (2006), 26.
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The fourth condition of the DDE is a proportionality requirement: “there is
proportionately grave reason for causing the evil effect.”92 What constitutes ‘grave reason’? On
Cavanaugh’s view,
Obligations that attend one’s role as, for example, a mother, brother, friend, wife,
fireman, teacher, doctor, soldier, or fellow countryman, partially constitute
proportionately grave reasons. Consequences count. Obligations matter. Both comprise
proportionately grave reasons.93
Thus, not only are agents duty-bound to avoid causing harm if they can achieve the good
some other way; they are additionally duty-bound to avoid acts which would cause harm if the
good for which they cause harm is not proportionate. If there is an alternative end for which the
harmful effects are endured, that end must be obligatory to pursue. Given this condition and its
centrality for permissible double-effect cases, and given the Foreseen-Effects Selection Principle
above, the following principle is plausible:
FORESEEN EFFECT NECESSITY:

Defender’s assaulting Threat as a foreseen effect is
justified only if Defender is morally obligated to
pursue the act that would include assaulting Threat
as a foreseen effect.94

Yet MS Necessity, ES Necessity, and FES Necessity entail a modification to the account
of the necessity condition95:
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Cavanaugh (2006), 26.
Cavanaugh (2006), 32.
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Given Ends Necessity, Foreseen Effect Necessity might be redundant for current purposes. In
Foreseen Effect, agents are forbidden from selecting acts which result in assault in order to
preserve some good, unless the selection of that good is obligatory. But here, the good functions
as an end as it is what one does the act for. Still, given the complexity of double-effect cases and
given that such cases do not obviously reduce to selecting assault as a means or an end, it is
prudent to include a separate treatment of double-effect cases.
95
The entailment is strict: if Defender assaults Threat, then it is Defender’s act that assaults or
leads to the (avoidable) assault of Threat. This excludes cases in which Defender accidentally
(that is, without intending and without selecting an act with the foreseen outcome of assaulting)
harms Threat. (Alternatively, if it is possible to assault someone accidentally, there cannot be a
93
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NECESSITY:

Defender’s assaulting Threat is justified only if
Defender is morally obligated to do something
which requires assaulting Threat.

But this makes trouble for the defender of SD1, as shown in the following argument:

The Argument
(P1)
(P2)
(C1)

If there are cases of justified self-defensive assault, they are cases of
merely justified self-defensive assault. [SD1, assumed for reductio]
There are no cases of merely justified self-defensive assault.
[NECESSITY]
Therefore, there are no justified acts of self-defense. [from P1 and P2]

Necessity (above) implies that if assault is justified, there is a moral obligation to assault.
Thus, all cases of justified assault are cases of morally obligatory assault. No act can be both
merely permissible and obligatory, from which it follows that no act of justified self-defense is
merely morally permissible, which contradicts SD1.
4. Objections
Forfeiture theories of justified self-defense raise special problems for The Argument. On
forfeiture theories, when Threat unjustly attacks you, she forfeits her right not to be attacked. But
if Threat forfeits her right not to be assaulted, then it cannot at the same time be true that there is
some pro tanto duty not to assault Threat – for that is, ex hypothesi, precisely what Threat
forfeited.
P2 of The Argument is supported in the following way. Every case in which it is merely
permissible to assault in self-defense is also a case in which one’s pro tanto duty not to assault
corresponding moral duty not to assault persons accidentally, because unintentional actions are
not the sort of thing agents have duties not to perform. But then this possibility makes no
difference to the entailment.) If Defender knowingly assaults Threat, she either: assaults Threat
as an end, assaults Threat as a means, or assaults Threat as a foreseen effect.
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remains in place.96 But if one’s pro tanto duty remains in place, then (contrary to SD1) there
cannot be any mere right to assault in self-defense. Where the argument goes wrong, according
to the objection, is in assuming that every case in which there is a mere right to self-defensive
assault is also a case in which the presumption against assault is maintained. That is false, at least
if forfeiture theories are true (or possibly true).
The Forfeiture Objection is given strength and clarity by putting it in some standard
argumentative form.
The Argument from Forfeiture97
(P1)
(P2)

If Threat poses an unjust Threat to Defender, then Threat has forfeited his
right not to be assaulted by Defender.
If Threat has forfeited his right not to be assaulted by Defender, then
Defender has a mere right to assault Threat.98

96

Whereas a right to assault would be sufficient to make self-defensive assault permissible, The
Argument offers evidence against the very possibility of such a right, as it would condone
causing unnecessary harm.
97
More formally:
(P1)
UF
(P2)
FR
(P3)
R  ~D
(P4)
U
(C1)
~D
98
It has been pointed out that the antecedent “Threat has forfeited his right not to be assaulted by
Defender” does not entail “Defender has a mere right to assault Threat,” because there might be
cases in which Threat forfeits his right and Defender is obligated to assault Threat. But consider
the following revised argument:
(P1)
If Threat poses an unjust threat to Defender, then Threat has forfeited his right not
to be assaulted by Defender.
(P2*)
If Threat has forfeited his right not to be assaulted by Defender, then either:
Defender has a mere right to assault Threat, or Defender has an obligation to
assault Threat.
(PX)
Defender has no obligation to assault Threat.
(CX)
Therefore, Defender has a mere right to assault Threat.
(P3)
If Defender has a mere right to assault Threat, then Defender is not obligated not
to assault Threat.
(C1)
Therefore, Defender is not obligated not too assault Threat.
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(P3)
(P4)
(C1)

If Defender has a mere right to assault Threat, then Defender is not
obligated not to assault Threat.
Threat poses an unjust threat to Defender.
Therefore, Defender is not obligated not to assault Threat.

So understood, there are at least two criticisms put forward by the defender of the
Forfeiture Objection. The first is that The Argument begs the question against forfeiture accounts
of self-defense by assuming their falsity and then arguing for their falsity. The second criticism is
that while The Argument itself does not beg the question against forfeiture accounts, it is
insufficiently or improperly motivated: the defender of forfeiture will merely deny that Necessity
is true, given the possibility of forfeiture, and the defender of The Argument is left either
stipulating that theories of forfeiture are false (which begs the question) or having failed to
consider those theories (leaving The Argument in need of significant revisions or giving it a
narrower victory than it claims).
These objections will be taken in turn. First, the responder has at least two plausible
avenues of escape. The first is to provide a similar argument with importantly reordered premises
to show that The Argument need not formally beg the question against the defender of forfeiture
theories:
The Argument Against Forfeiture99
(P1)

If Defender is obligated not to assault Threat, then Defender has no mere
right to assault Threat.

Here, the antecedent of P2* clearly entails its consequent. PX will be considered and refuted in
the next chapter, leaving us with CX: Defender has a mere right to assault Threat. Following
SD1, this chapter is restricted to theories of self-defense on which Defender has a mere right to
assault Threat, thereby excluding forfeiture theories where Defender has an obligation to assault
Threat.
99
More formally:
(P1)
D  ~R
(P2)
~R  ~F
(P3)
D
(C1)
~F
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(P2)
(P3)
(C2)

If Defender has no mere right to assault Threat, then Threat has not
forfeited his right not to be assaulted.
Defender is obligated not to assault Threat.
Therefore, Threat has not forfeited his right not to be assaulted.

Note that P1 is both necessarily true and strictly implied by P3 in The Argument from
Forfeiture100, and P2 is strictly implied by P2 in The Argument from Forfeiture.101 More will be
said about the defense of P3 as it was defended for The Argument, but for now it is sufficient to
point out that there is no objectionable circularity in the argument. Furthermore, a proper defense
of P3 will imply the falsity of P1 in The Argument from Forfeiture. P1 states that: U  F and, by
extended consequence, ~D. Thus, any argument for D will entail the falsity of either U or, more
plausibly, U  F, assuming the truth of the intermediate steps.102
A defense of The Argument from the charge of formal circularity does not clear it of the
charge of motivating circularity. Fortunately, The Argument can also be cleared of this charge.
First, the cases motivating P3103 in The Argument from Forfeiture fail to specify why selfdefensive assault is permissible. But then the examples do not assume the falsity of forfeiture

100

(P3)
R  ~D
(PX)
D
(C)
~R
Therefore,
(P1)
D  ~R
101
(P2)
FR
(PX)
~R
(C)
~F
Therefore,
(P2)
~R  ~F
102
Such an argument might be formulated as follows, where U is granted and the intermediate
steps entailing PY (below) are assumed:
(PY)
(U  F)  ~D
(PZ)
D
(C)
~(U  F)
103
In my central argument (The Argument), this is the defense of P2.
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theories of self-defense. Insofar as these cases are plausible and acquire their plausibility without
assuming the falsity of forfeiture theories, there is no motivating circularity.
Second, cases can be constructed in which forfeiture theories are initially explicitly
assumed and then argued against. Consider, for example, the following case:
FORFEITER unjustly attacks Defender in a pub. In doing so, Forfeiter forfeits his right not
to be assaulted. However, Defender need not assault Forfeiter to save her life: Defender
can sidestep Forfeiter’s attacks and easily escape the pub unscathed.
The defender of forfeiture accounts has two, and only two, possible moves in this case:
either deny that this is a case of forfeiture or claim that Defender would not act wrongly in
assaulting Forfeiter. The latter reply is false because it violates the Means Selection Principle and
MS Necessity: if there is a reasonably accessible alternative to Defender, then Defender ought to
take it. This plausibly leads to a motivated denial of the claim that Forfeiter forfeits his right not
to be assaulted: when reasonably accessible means are available, there can be no right not to use
those means, and thus there can be no forfeiture which would give one the right not to use those
means.104 A similar response can be given to the former reply: even if this is not a case of
forfeiture, the following is motivated and, plausibly, holds: if there is some reasonably
accessible, permissible end, then (by the End Selection Principle) there can be no mere right not
to select that end, and thus no possibility of forfeiture entailing the right not to select that end.

104

On a variation of this reply, defenders of forfeiture theories could argue that no forfeiture
occurs but there is an overriding consideration in play. Because the case does not describe any
overriding consideration, one is left to assume that the only plausible overriding consideration is
Necessity, but that extends to all cases and therefore does not help defenders of forfeiture
theories.
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Another objection concerns the status of the right to self-defensive assault as a derivative
right. It is in virtue of certain rights Defender possesses that she has a right to self-defense. Rodin
explains this well:
[T]he subject has a right to the good whose protection is the end of defensive action.
Defensive rights seem to be entailed in a very basic way by rights to things. Thus if I
have a right to X, then it seems to follow as a simple corollary that I have the right to take
measures to prevent my right to X from being violated.105
The simplest cases are property protection, legal protection, and rights against assault. If
Owner has a right to keep her property, then Owner has a right to store her property in a
protective lockbox. If Defendant has a right to a fair trial, then Defendant has a right to an
attorney. By extension, if Defender has a right not to be assaulted unjustly, then Defender has the
corollary right to protect that right from violation or infringement. Where that right can be
protected from Threat in no other way than self-defensive assault, Defender is justified in
assaulting Threat.106
But the corollary Rodin suggests is surely false, and true only if modified. Agents cannot
do simply anything to protect their rights from being violated or infringed. For instance, even if
such means are necessary, Owner cannot permissibly torture the thief’s children to recover the
stolen property, and Defendant cannot threaten an attorney with death in order to acquire an
attorney for defense. Likewise, Defender cannot permissibly assault Threat unless doing so is
necessary in the sense that fulfills the required necessity conditions heretofore defended. The
right not to be unjustly assaulted (call this right Z), for example, does not permit Defender to
assault Threat if Z can be protected by fleeing or distracting Threat. But it also does not permit
105

Rodin (2002), 37.
It will be assumed that this justification comes by way of a mere right, and not a duty. But it
might be that there is a duty to protect one’s rights, as considered (and rejected) in the following
chapter.
106
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Defender to assault Threat if it is not obligatory to defend Z, since an end other than Z is
permissible to adopt and that alternative end does not require assault.
5. Conclusion
This chapter considered the following thesis about self-defense:
SELF-DEFENSE 1:

All acts of justified self-defense are (merely) morally
justified.

The view is widely held in the self-defense literature, and appears to be the consensus
view. This chapter sought to criticize the consensus and argue against SD1. It was argued that
certain restraints on justified self-defensive assault include the necessity condition. Narrowly, the
necessity condition entails a Means Selection Principle and a Means Selection Necessity
condition. This forbids defenders from assaulting threats when there is some reasonably
accessible and permissible alternative to doing so. But any plausible necessity condition will
likewise extend further to the End Selection Principle and the Foreseen Effects Selection
Principle, which respectively entail the End Selection Necessity condition and the Foreseen
Effects Necessity condition. These entail that defenders cannot justifiably assault threats as
intended or foreseen ends unless there are no reasonably accessible, permissible, alternative ends
or effects which do not include assault. Where such alternative means, ends, or foreseen effects
are available, agents should select them. Since those alternatives are always available, given each
agent’s right to forego self-defensive assault, agents are obligated to select them, and this implies
the falsity of SD1.

44

CHAPTER 3:
Against Obligatory Self-Defense

1. Introduction
In the last chapter, it was primarily argued that self-defensive assault is not a mere right,
and some considerations were also offered suggesting that it is not a duty. If both of these claims
are true, it follows that there is no right to self-defense. Given the moral presumption against
assaulting persons without justification, it was argued that it is wrong always, everywhere, and
for anyone to assault a person unless doing so is obligatory. Though the chapter offered reasons
to believe that self-defense is neither a mere right nor a duty, it offered stronger reasons to
believe that it is not a mere right. This chapter is a partial effort to remedy that imbalance,
strengthening the case against the following claim:
SELF-DEFENSE 2:107

Acts of self-defense are (pro tanto) morally required.

An act’s being pro tanto morally required entails that all agents who intentionally and
without justification fail to act in self-defense act wrongly. Setting aside the criticisms of
obligatory self-defense from the previous chapter, there is some motivation to accept SD2. The
majority of persons, including philosophers, maintain that there is a right to self-defense. But
suppose it is first accepted both that any right to self-defense is necessarily either a mere right or
a duty, and also that, as argued in the previous chapter, the right to self-defense is not a mere
right. The only possible alternative for self-defense proponents is that self-defense is a duty.
Thus, SD2 can be made initially plausible simply by disjunctive elimination.

107

Hereafter, “SD2.”
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The defense of SD2 is hardly reducible to a cornered fight, however. There has been,
historically, some additional support for SD2.108 Even absent these historical considerations,
other theories of self-defense might provide backing for SD2. Jeff McMahan109 employs the use
of a legal analogy in support of a justice-based theory of self-defense:
It may be instructive to compare liability to defensive action to liability in tort law. Just
as we may think of liability in torts as a matter of corrective justice, or justice in the
distribution of harm ex post, so we may think of liability to defensive action as a matter
of preventative justice, or justice in the distribution of harm ex ante.110
The legal analogy functions to highlight the justness of self-defensive assault: tort law
provides justice for those already harmed, whereas self-defense provides justice to those who are
being or would be harmed. Elsewhere, McMahan expands his justice-based account of justified
self-defense:
…in cases in which a person’s culpable action (whether past or present does not matter)
has made it inevitable that someone must suffer harm, it is normally permissible, as a
matter of justice, to ensure that it is the culpable person who is harmed rather than
allowing the costs of his wrongful action to be imposed on the morally innocent. In
particular, if one person’s culpable action threatens the life of another, it is permissible as
a matter of justice to kill that person rather than to allow his culpable action to kill a
morally innocent person, for considerations of justice give the innocent priority over the
morally noninnocent.111
Tyler Doggett summarizes McMahan’s view:
It is permissible to kill X because it is just. It is just to kill X because X is responsible for
an unjust threat to your life. X is responsible for that threat because he engaged in an
activity that foreseeably put your life at risk and that risk eventuated.112
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See Rodin (2002), 39:
It has been an element of certain Christian teachings that we are under a duty to preserve
our own life (which is why suicide is considered a sin) and that self-defense is therefore
obligatory.
109
Also see the description of McMahan’s position in chapter 2.
110
McMahan (2005), 395.
111
McMahan (1994b), 259.
112
Doggett (2012), 223.
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Defending a culpability theory of self-defense, Kai Draper writes:
…the fact that [the threat] is to blame for the threat to your life does provide you with a
justification for killing him. For it is inevitable that either you or [the threat] will die, and
this is entirely his fault. Thus, it would be unfair to expect you to die instead of him, for
then you would be paying the foreseeable costs of his moral error.113
Whereas Doggett speaks explicitly of permissibility, McMahan speaks of the innocent
having “priority” and Draper of fairness. Priority and fairness might be purely presumptive; that
is, morally speaking, it may be up to the innocent whether or not they will act in self-defense.
Following Rodin, we might say that the morally innocent are in possession of a full liberty to
self-defense. To say that someone has a full liberty to Y is just to say that it is permissible both
for that person to Y, and permissible for that person not to Y.114 One alternative, however, is that
the morally innocent lack a full liberty to self-defense, and instead possess only a half-liberty to
self-defense, since failing to self-defend is impermissible for them.115 We might say that the
morally innocent lack a right to self-defense because the self-defensive course of action is not
only just, or more just than failing to self-defend, but uniquely just. On this account, failing to
self-defend is unjust (or, on Draper’s account, unfair) and therefore wrong. Such conclusions
would, if plausible, entail SD2.
Thus far SD2 has been interpreted to claim that self-defense is obligatory as an end. But
it might also be obligatory as a means. To see this, consider first the putative duty to otherdefense:
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Draper (1993), 75.
Rodin (2002), 20. Rodin borrows heavily from Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld and importantly
from Joel Feinberg. For an elaboration on Hohfeld’s ‘building blocks’ of rights, as well as
qualifications suggested by Feinberg and Rodin, see Rodin (2002), 17-23.
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Rodin (2002), 20: “Thus, one may have a Hohfeldian liberty to do a certain thing with respect
to a certain party and yet have no liberty not to do it.” The language of ‘half-liberties’ is
Feinberg’s. See Feinberg (1980), 157, 237.
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We usually think that if a person is unjustly attacked, it is morally permissible for others
to come to their rescue. We might even think that rendering such assistance is, at least
prima facie, morally required. We generally condemn those who stand by and do nothing
when a person is under attack, which suggests that we conceive of other-defense as a duty
rather than a mere permission.116
Suppose that in order to protect someone from unjust attack, it is necessary first to defend
yourself. If other-defense is obligatory, then you ought to defend yourself in these circumstances.
This can be inferred from the general principle that if X is obligatory and Y is necessary to bring
about X, then Y is obligatory. Of course, this principle requires the implicit assumption that Y
must not itself be impermissible. It is difficult to see how X could be obligatory if it required
some impermissible act, Y, and the fact that X is ex hypothesi obligatory itself lends support to
the thesis that Y is permissible.
Justice-based theories of self-defense succeed, however, in supporting SD2 where these
latter means-based attempts at support fail. At best, these latter observations provide contingent
support for SD2; they show that self-defense is sometimes obligatory as a means, but not that
self-defense is itself pro tanto obligatory. To say that self-defense is pro tanto obligatory is to
say that would-be victims are obligated to assault or kill in self-defense if other things are
equal.117 Thus, even if no others stand in need of protection, the would-be victim is morally
required, absent countervailing considerations, to defend herself. Because self-defense is morally
required of agents even when others at not at risk according to SD2, the duty to defend others
cannot fully explain or support SD2. What the duty of other-defense cannot explain or support in
this case, however, justice-based theories might. If, as noted earlier, self-defense is simply the
only way to meet the requirements of justice, then self-defense is plausibly obligatory.
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Frowe (2011), 24.
While this is the standard view of pro tanto duties, its acceptance is not universal. For
objections to this formulation, see Dancy (2006), 39-60.
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2. Permissible Action and the Trivializability Constraint
I claim that there is what I shall call a Trivializability Constraint for permissible action.
This constraint is a side-constraint in the sense described by Robert Nozick: an act is permissible
for some agent only if it does not violate any (absolute) side-constraint.118 The constraint
defended here is:
CONSTRAINT 1:

There is some class of duties which are nontrivializable.

The sense of trivializability relevant to this constraint is:
TRIVIALIZABILITY:

A duty, X, is trivialized if there is some possible
world in which some agent is objectively morally
justified in treating or regarding a violation or
disregarding of X as morally inconsequential.

Conceive of a case in which a moral agent comes justifiably to regard some duty in a
morally inconsequential way. The sense in which this agent is justified is objective, and not
(merely) epistemic119: her (pro tanto) duty is trumped by some outweighing consideration or
effectively undermined, and she knows this.120 Suppose the agent regards her duty, X, as morally
inconsequential by treating its nonperformance with a sort of moral ease: she very casually
disregards X and does not give a second thought to doing so.121,122
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See Nozick (1974), 28-33.
Cf. Jeff McMahan’s overview of the distinction in his (2011), chapter 4, especially 162-163.
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This is not quite the case in forfeiture accounts of self-defense, in which aggressors (of some
type or other), by aggressing, lose their claim-right to life (or, at least, their right not to be
defensively attacked). In such cases, the corresponding pro tanto duty not to assault the
aggressors disappears. See McMahan (2011), 10.
121
“Regarding” might appear tacitly to endorse some form of doxastic voluntarism, since it
requires agents neither to treat nor regard a violation or disregarding of X as morally
inconsequential. But the sense of regarding need not be doxastic, and the only relevant doxastic
cases are ones in which one does have even some voluntary control over one’s beliefs. For
example, if one voluntarily selects actions one knows will result in believing, or believing more
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Agents exemplifying this sort of moral ease act permissibly in cases where X is itself
pretty trivial. Suppose X is the duty to respect the wishes of my friend not to modify the position
of her ceramic penguin, since it slightly annoys her when the penguin faces any direction other
than North. But suppose that you likewise have a duty, Y, to move the penguin because it has
been filled with explosives which will detonate in seconds. It would certainly be wrong, all
things considered, not to move the penguin, and the pro tanto duty X (the duty not to violate the
wishes of your friend) is so seriously trumped that one would be justified in disregarding X with
moral ease. All agents who perform Y over X in this case, and do so with moral ease, are quite
justified in regarding X as morally inconsequential.
Other duties, other substitutes for X, are unlike the exploding penguin case. Let X be the
pro tanto duty not to torture persons and assume, for the sake of argument, that X can be
overridden or undermined, perhaps on grounds of self-defense or other-defense, as Steinhoff
argues:
There is no morally relevant difference between self-defensive killing of a culpable
aggressor and torturing someone who is culpable of a deadly threat that can be averted
only by torturing him.123
In some theories of self-defense, it is permissible to assault culpable aggressors when
necessary for self-protection because those aggressors have, via their culpability, forfeited their
right not to be assaulted. Though many advocates of self-defense will not concede Steinhoff’s
assertion that self-defensive assault is morally indistinct from self-defensive torture, assume that
strongly, that X is morally inconsequential, then one would act wrongly in choosing those
actions.
122
Cf. Nagel (2005), 75-90. Nagel suggests that citizens have an interest in having political
leaders who are ruthless and carry out the business of the state, but their ruthlessness should not
become internalized. (In the terms employed here, ruthless actions should not be carried out with
ease.)
123
Steinhoff (2006), 337. Cf. Steinhoff (2012), 19-26; Steinhoff (2013); Frowe (2011), chapter 9.
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self-defensive torture is sometimes permissible on the grounds that X can be overridden or
undermined.124
UNEASY TORTURING DEFENDER knows that self-defensive torture is permissible and
finds herself in a circumstance in which torturing a person is her only means of selfdefense. She tortures the threat but without moral ease: she does not enjoy it, is cautious
to inflict only the harms she deems necessary, and participates with a high degree of
hesitation and trepidation.
Uneasy Torturing Defender does not enjoy torture in any way; she regards it as
unfortunate that it is at all instrumentally necessary for her own defense (or the defense of
others). She realizes too that torture, even in self-defense, is a very morally serious activity, and
she responds appropriately by taking great pains to be sure that each cut and each blow is
absolutely necessary, giving her threat ample time between each clipped nail to reconsider
sharing information relevant to the threat against Uneasy Torturing Defender.125 But consider a
variation on Uneasy Torturing Defender:
NONCHALANT TORTURING DEFENDER learns that Threat is nearby, and she decides to
kidnap Threat and torture him for information necessary to save her life. With each
electrical shock and pried fingernail, Nonchalant Torturing Defender proceeds with moral
nonchalance: she does not give much additional thought to whether some harm she
inflicts is necessary or whether her torturous acts are right.
Unlike Uneasy Torturing Defender, who responded appropriately to the moral graveness
of torture, Nonchalant Torturing Defender fails to respond appropriately. Torture is intrinsically
grave and the moral risks associated with it are plentiful: inappropriate emotional attitudes
towards or reactions to harming others, objectifying victims, resorting to inappropriate means
124

See the challenge to this conclusion by Bufacchi and Arrigo (2006).
This does not assume that there are no metaphysically vague cases in which it is
indeterminate whether inflicting some harm H is necessary (or, is among a set of comparable
alternatives, one of which is necessary) to achieve goal G, or that there are no cases in which it is
epistemically unclear whether H is necessary to achieve G. Rather, the claim is simply that no
agent is possibly objectively justified in assuming that H is necessary to achieve G when H is pro
tanto seriously morally wrong.
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(torturing non-threatening family, for example), torturing victims even after they have
surrendered information due to uncertainty about the truthfulness of their claim to have
surrendered the correct information, and more. Thus, even if torturing in self-defense is justified,
this does not permit anyone to treat torture in any way that would constitute a nonchalant or
casual attitude toward its moral seriousness. Everyone everywhere always has a duty to take
torture seriously, even if they are inflicting it with justification.
This raises two significant questions. First, for members of the class of duties for which
there is a trivializability constraint, what makes them members of that class? Second, if members
of that class cannot be trivialized, what special moral relations and functions (if any) are
rendered impossible in virtue of the constraint?
It is not necessary for the purposes of this paper to sketch the full set of necessary and
sufficient conditions for what qualifies a duty for the trivializability constraint. It is enough to
show that there is a trivializability constraint for assaulting persons. To this end, one sufficient
condition will be identified and defended.
The short defense is as follows. All persons have properties, some of which are essential.
One essential property of persons is being extremely morally considerable. This property
necessarily confers a right126 to all persons, a right they cannot forfeit and a right that cannot be
countervailed: the right not to be treated carelessly or, when harming them, harming them
casually.
The longer defense begins with a defense of the claim that all persons possess that
essential property. To begin, consider that every person has a presumptive right against being
126

This is true only if there are rights. It is assumed that there are, but the following judgments
about what is permissible and what is not do not depend upon the existence of rights.
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harmed or killed. This right is absolutely presumptive: it holds absent any forfeiting or
countervailing conditions.127 Said another way, the right against being harmed or killed holds
whenever the person being harmed or killed neither forfeits that right nor has that right
countervailed. Consider such a case. Harmless is not attacking anyone and there is no moral
good worth preserving or evil worth preventing. Thus, there is no moral reason to kill Harmless.
If you harm or kill Harmless, you have wronged him, and this is true in all possible worlds in
which you harm or kill Harmless under these conditions. By modal implication, Harmless
necessarily has the right not to be harmed or killed absent forfeiture or countervailing conditions.
As it concerns harming or killing persons, the threshold at which countervailing
conditions obtain is high. If a gallon of milk will be spilt unless Harmless is harmed or killed, we
ought not to harm or kill Harmless. If Harmless will die unless he tosses Bystander under the
Greyhound bus, Harmless still ought not to toss Bystander under the Greyhound bus.
Restrictions on permissible harming and killing are plentiful, even in cases of justified selfdefense.
Moreover, even in cases where countervailing (but not forfeiting) conditions do obtain, it
is sometimes the case that there exists some residual duty to the person or persons harmed or
killed. McMahan, for example, writes:
When one thus permissibly acts against a right, I will say that one infringes that right,
whereas when one impermissibly does what another has a right that one not do, one
violates that right. Even though an agent acts permissibly in infringing a right, the victim
is nonetheless wronged and may thus be owed compensation.128
127

Forfeiture conditions operate in the following way: if some circumstance C obtains, then
person S forfeits S’s right. Countervailing conditions operate in the following way: if some
circumstance C obtains and is stronger than the relevant right, then S’s right is permissibly
overridden (or trumped).
128
McMahan (2011), 10.
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A paradigmatic example of residual duty is a modified trolley case in which either
Unlucky will lose his leg or five people will die. Assuming it is permissible to switch the track
such that Unlucky loses his leg, it appears true both that Unlucky had a right not to have his leg
taken and Unlucky is owed compensation. When non-combatants are unintentionally harmed as
a direct result of tactical bombing or other means of offensive warfare, they too are plausibly
owed compensation if such compensation can be provided.129 More strongly, every person whose
right is infringed in McMahan’s sense is owed compensation, other things equal.
The moral significance of entities like persons, each of whom possesses a necessary
presumptive right not to be harmed and a presumptive right to compensation in cases of rightinfringement is nearly inestimable. These rights appear to confer an extremely considerable
moral status: the rights are possessed presumptively, have a remarkably high countervailing
threshold, and are possessed by every person in all possible worlds in which those persons exist.
Furthermore, the extremely morally considerable nature of persons is grounded in the modal
properties possessed, which persons continue to possess even if, for example, their right not to be
harmed or killed is forfeited or countervailed in the actual world. Supposing that Threat’s right to
life or not to be harmed is forfeited or countervailed in the actual world, it hardly follows that
those rights of Threat’s or their presumptive force are forfeited or countervailed transworldly.
Even if Forfeiter forfeits his right not to be assaulted today because he aggresses unjustly against
Defender, Forfeiter does not thereby absolutely forfeit his right across possible worlds. Rather,
Forfeiter retains his presumptive right not to be assaulted such that when there is no reason to
harm Forfeiter, then harming Forfeiter is wrong. These essential properties of persons, therefore,
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See Brummer. (1996).
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ground the following right of persons: the right not to be treated carelessly or, when harming
them, harming them casually.
3. Relations Affected by Trivializability
Because of trivializability constraints, certain moral relations are affected. Relations
affected by persons with the relevant rights will include, among other things, the overdetermined
relation. To say that a duty to self-defend is overdetermined is to say that there is more than one
independent duty in a single case whose normative implications include justified self-defense.
For example, if one’s duty to protect one’s children130, x, implies that one must self-defend, and
if one likewise has a duty to protect oneself131, y, and if defending oneself is likewise necessary
to prevent catastrophe132, z, then one’s duties to x, y, and z supply independent normative support
for self-defending. The duty to self-defend is overdetermined because it is sufficient for one’s
duty to self-defend that x be one’s duty, where x-ing entails self-defending: x determines, in the
sense of grounding, that self-defense ought to be done. The addition of y and z further grounds
and supports the duty to self-defend, effectively adding to the justification of self-defense qua
obligation.
There is conclusive reason to believe that all theories of justified self-defense in principle
permit overdetermination.133 According to all such theories, self-defense is not absolutely wrong
(that is, it would be actually justified in some possible circumstance C) and can be motivated
(that is, there would be moral reason to self-defend in possible circumstance C). Each of these
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See Davion (1990), 92; Derek Parfit (2011), 205; Narveson (1965), 262.
See footnote 108.
132
See Steinhoff (2006).
133
Excluding, of course, skeptical or disaffirming theories of self-defense like pacifism, which
imply that there is no right to self-defense.
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conditions is strictly necessary for overdetermination.134 If self-defense was absolutely
prohibited, it would necessarily fail to make any duty justified (or contribute to the justification
of any duty). Thus, x or y could make self-defense justified or, for that matter, contribute to that
justification, only if self-defense is not absolutely prohibited.
Moreover, it must be the case that self-defense is possibly motivated. This assumption is
not built into the conception of self-defense being actually justified in C, since self-defense
might be justified even if there is no moral reason to act in self-defense. The criminal who breaks
into someone’s home in order to steal a leftover blood sample for a harmless science project
might justify that person in using defensive measures to prevent the vandalism, but it is not clear
that there is any moral reason to prevent this. The person who finds this activity strange but
harmless is hardly lacking in moral reasons-responsiveness when she fails to defend herself
against the taking of the sample.
While these observations alone do not conclusively support the conclusion that all
theories of self-defense permit overdetermination, they do some work in clearing the way of
conceptual obstacles. In particular, they show that two possibilities which necessarily would
make overdetermination impossible do not hold for theories of self-defense. This provides some
support for the conclusion that overdetermination is (necessarily) possible for theories of selfdefense. Fortunately, stronger support can be given.
An extended fully a priori defense of the possibility of overdetermination includes cases
in which overdetermination appears obvious. There are, necessarily, possible worlds in which
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Both are likewise necessary for moral determination (again, in the grounding sense).
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there is more than one duty which normatively implies a self-defensive requirement.135 Call the
particular circumstances of that world ‘C’. Returning to our earlier example, we have the
following set of duties136:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)

x: all parents have a pro tanto duty to protect their children;
y: all innocent persons have a pro tanto duty to protect themselves; and
z: all persons have a pro tanto duty to prevent catastrophe.

Let us suppose that the following is true of C at time t:
(iv)
(v)
(vi)

unless S self-defends at t, S will fail to x;
unless S self-defends at t, S will fail to y; and
unless S self-defends at t, S will fail to z.

Suppose also that there is no duty distinct from x, y, and z which implies that S ought to
self-defend at t in C, but that it is true that S ought to do so. Since something grounds S’s
obligation to self-defend at t in C, it follows from this that x, y, or z, or some combination
thereof, grounds S’s obligation to self-defend at t in C.137 Furthermore, assume (as is plausible)
that the following are likewise true of C:
(vii)
(viii)

there is no lexical priority amongst x, y, and z; and
there is no temporal priority amongst x, y, and z.

Thus, when S finds herself in C at t, there is no duty she first acquires and there is no duty
which enjoys a ‘first-to-ground’ privilege in virtue of some sort of lexical priority. In such a case,
it is true that no particular duty uniquely grounds S’s duty to self-defend in C at t. Yet since S’s
duty to self-defend in C at t is grounded by x, y, or z, or some combination thereof, it follows that
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Though this might appear question-begging, the relevant world will be described in a way that
does not beg the question.
136
The following set of duties can easily be substituted for a distinct set where the duties
requiring self-defense are more obviously such that there is no lexical priority.
137
The disjunction, therefore, is not assumed to be exclusive, but neither is it assumed to be
inclusive. Thus, the question of whether overdetermination is possible is not begged by the
inclusion of an ambiguous (though soon to be disambiguated) disjunction.
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S’s duty to self-defend in C at t is grounded by x, y, and z (each of which is sufficient for the
duty to self-defend). Therefore, S’s duty to self-defend in C at t is overdetermined.
There is another argument for this conclusion: a best-explanation argument. The duty to
self-defend appears stronger in cases in which more is at stake than in cases where less is at
stake. If S’s failure to self-defend would result in the death of his family and the destruction of
the greater Baltimore area, S’s duty to self-defend is plausibly stronger than in a case in which
S’s failure to self-defend would result merely in his own death. In such a case, S’s duty to selfdefend appears stronger because of the normative influence of certain counterfactual
considerations, namely, that the destruction of Baltimore would result and that would be worse.
Thus, the fact that the duty to self-defend appears sensitive to these concerns is further evidence
for the possibility of overdetermination.
The explanation acquires further strength when it is recognized that the relevant moral
considerations (preventing the death of one’s family and preventing the destruction of Baltimore)
are each individually sufficient to motivate at least a pro tanto duty to self-defense. Because of
this, each consideration is ordinarily duty-creating, and it is difficult to see why it would fail to
be duty-affecting in these cases.
But why is overdetermination ruled out by the trivializability constraint? To see why,
consider first that is a necessary truth that for every agent S (as argued in chapter 2), S has a
strong pro tanto duty to refrain from assaulting any person.138 If S is to be justified in assaulting
and even obligated to assault a person, then the pro tanto duty to refrain from doing so must be
138

It is a necessary truth because, as defended above, it is true in every possible world that if
persons exist, they have a presumptive right not to be killed or harmed, which entails a
corresponding duty on others not to harm or kill persons absent forfeiture and countervailing
considerations. But if some claim is true in every possible world, then it is a necessary truth.
58

trumped.139 But if it can be trumped and in a way that is overdetermined, a problem arises.140
Suppose that if Defender is to avoid the horrific leveling of Baltimore, she must torture Threat.
As in a previous case, Defender’s spouse, children, parents, and extended family live in
Baltimore. Defender is herself in Baltimore interrogating Threat. Grant lastly that torturing
Threat is obligatory and overwhelmingly so. If this is true, then one’s pro tanto duty not to
assault Threat (which includes torturing Threat) is trumped severely by one’s duty as defender,
such that the initial pro tanto duty would be trivialized.
For strict forfeiture theories of justified self-defensive assault, concerns of trivializability
work only somewhat differently. On strict forfeiture theories, Threat forfeits his right not to be
assaulted by Defender by unjustly attacking Defender. Because this right uniquely grounds the
pro tanto duty against assaulting Threat, its absence implies not a trumped pro tanto duty but an
absent pro tanto duty. Thus, if trivializability is possible in these cases on forfeiture theories, it
cannot be that the pro tanto duty is trivialized, because there is no pro tanto duty.
Recall that, as argued above, the rights of persons include the right not to be treated
carelessly and the right not to be harmed casually. This does not entail that rights depend on
whether persons forfeit their right not to be assaulted, for at least two reasons. First, the rights
appear logically distinct. The right not to be assaulted does not entail the right not to be treated
carelessly, for example. Second, the rights not to be treated carelessly and not to be harmed
casually are essential to persons whereas (according to forfeiture theories) the right not to be
assaulted is not an essential property of persons. Thus, the latter right can by hypothesis be
139

It might seem that trumping is unnecessary to justify assaulting a person, since it is commonly
assumed to be sufficient that the pro tanto duty of no-assault be undermined
(trumped/overridden), or given up (say, by forfeiture). But the mere absence of that pro tanto
duty would be insufficient to ground a duty to assault.
140
The metaphor of the trump card is illustrated powerfully by Dworkin (1984), chapter 6, 153.
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forfeited, but the former rights are not forfeited when the latter right is forfeited and cannot be
forfeited. What can be trivialized on forfeiture theories, then, is harming persons.141
We might tack on a fistful of other duties which coincide to overdetermine one’s duty to
torture Threat. In addition to x, y, and z, we might add q, r, s, and t, and so in. There might in
principle be an infinite number of such duties, or at least such a swath of duties that the pro tanto
duty to refrain from assault is inestimably outweighed. Recall the case in which a friend’s wish
to have her ceramic penguin face North ought to be violated since failing to move the penguin
will otherwise result in loss of life or limb. The savior’s pro tanto duty to act within the bounds
of her friend’s wishes is vastly overridden by the various duties requiring the savior to save lives.
It is because of this significantly overdetermined trump that the savior would be justified in
refusing to give even a second thought to tossing the penguin. Something similar could occur in
some cases of assault, however, in which self-defensive assault can be and is (over)determinately
justified. Yet this conclusion is vastly at odds with the existence of a trivializability constraint for
assaulting persons. Because there is such a constraint and because the possibility of justified selfdefensive

assault

entails

the

possibility

of

overdetermination,

and

because

such

overdetermination would result in trivializing a duty for which there is a trivializability
constraint, we should conclude that self-defensive assault is not possibly justified.
4. Objections
The lynchpin of the argument against SD2 concerns overdetermination. In that argument,
it was claimed that any number of distinct duties might normatively affect the duty to self-defend
141

Where overdetermination occurs and objectively justifies casually harming Threat or treating
Threat carelessly, there is no (absolute) right not to be harmed casually and no (absolute) right
not to be treated carelessly. Where there are such (absolute) rights, trivializability and the
overdetermination implying it are therefore impossible.
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against an aggressor. Because of this, the moral presumption against assaulting a person would
be trivialized in whichever possible worlds the horde of duties overdetermines the justification
for assaulting a person. In virtue of this false modal implication, SD2 is false.
What might be said against this suggestion is that the argument itself provides principled
reason to reject the very possibility of trivializing overdetermination while maintaining the
possibility of some overdetermination. This might appear ad hoc, but it need not in fact be so.
The argument offered here might as well be an argument against the possibility of excessive
overdetermination, and one might suppose that this is logically compatible with the truth of
SD2.142 Moreover, this suggestion is compatible with agnosticism about what the precise cutoff
conditions for normative influence are: which duties are disqualified, to what extent normative
influence can occur, and the like. Thus, the objector might concede that the a priori argument
above would be compelling if there were not countervailing a priori considerations, such as this
argument provides. More specifically, the a priori argument would succeed in showing that
trivializing overdetermination is made possible by SD2 only if there is no principled way for
SD2 to remain true while ruling out trivializing overdetermination, but this is precisely what is
made possible by the argument against SD2.
Beyond trivializing the presumptive duty against assaulting persons (call that duty ‘p’),
there is a secondary constraint for p. Consider the following case:
ALMOST NONCHALANT TORTURING DEFENDER captures and tortures Threat to prevent a
catastrophe. Defender realizes that torturing Threat cannot be trivialized, and she does not
demonstrate a total lack of moral attentiveness to whether her actions are necessary, right,
etc. She is not nonchalant. But she is close to being nonchalant; she remains very
comfortable and assuming and regards torturing Threat as nearly inconsequential.
142

Unless, as has been argued here, and as will be further argued in a moment, SD2 does entail
the possibility of trivializing overdetermination.
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While not acting quite as wrongly as Nonchalant Torturing Defender, Almost Nonchalant
Torturing Defender does act wrongly. She acts wrongly because torturing a person is not neartrivializable, and thus it is wrong to treat torturing a person as if it is near-trivializable. Thus, for
some duties, there is a secondary constraint:
CONSTRAINT 2:

There is some class of duties which are not neartrivializable.

The account of near-trivializability is conceptually similar to the account of
trivializability:
NEAR-TRIVIALIZABILITY:

A duty, X, is nearly trivialized if there is some
possible world in which some agent is objectively
morally justified in treating or regarding a
violation or disregarding of X as nearly morally
inconsequential.

To forbid agents from treating or regarding a violation or disregarding of some duty as
nearly morally inconsequential is, again, not to require those agents to feel or believe a particular
way about a duty. Furthermore, it is logically possible for some agent to violate her duty to
observe the near-trivializability constraint for the duties admitting of such a constraint, yet fail to
do so in a blameworthy way. An agent might be unaware that there is such a constraint, and thus
would not plausibly be blameworthy for failing to abide by the normative demands of the
constraint. Thus, the agent might be epistemically (or subjectively) morally justified in treating
or regarding X as if it were morally inconsequential, but she could not be objectively morally
justified.
As in the case of torture, I claim that there is a near-trivializability constraint for the duty
against assaulting persons, p; thus, p cannot be nearly trivialized. It would be objectively wrong
for an agent to assault a person by breaking her finger in a morally near-nonchalant way, say, by
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taking it seriously but in a borderline way: one is very nearly not taking it seriously. Because a
near-trivializability constraint exists for p, which includes all cases of assaulting persons, it
extends to cases in which assaulting persons is done under widely-believed justifying conditions
for self-defense.
The argument from the trivializability constraint proceeded as follows: there is a
trivializability constraint for p, which entails that p cannot be trivialized, and p would be
trivialized if severe overdetermination for justifying violating p was possible. Necessarily, if SD2
is true, then severe overdetermination for justifying violating p is possible. Therefore, SD2 is
false. The trivializability constraint for p draws a metaphorical line in the sand: there is a cap on
the number of duties or extent to which duties can normatively affect one’s justification for
violating p. For example, suppose that x, y, and z each individually normatively justifies
assaulting a person in self-defense and therefore violating p. If x, y, and z normatively justified
this, they would severely overdetermine (and therefore trivialize) violating p. However, suppose
that if only x and y normatively justified violating p, the violation of p would not be trivialized
by severe overdetermination. In that case, z remains a pro tanto duty, but it does not normatively
support violating p because it literally cannot do so.143 This is analogous to a case in which the
duty to prevent catastrophe does not imply that one ought to violate the duty to refrain from
committing genocide: because genocide is absolutely wrong, it cannot be morally required, and
thus no duty can stand in the relevant justifying relation. A trivializability constraint makes
severe overdetermination impossible, and therefore makes impossible any and all relations which
would entail such severe overdetermination.
143

Thus, z is a pro tanto duty in the following sense: it is normative or has normative
implications, other things being equal. Absent special conditions, agents should z. Alternately or
in addition, z is a pro tanto duty in the following sense: agents should z, but not all avenues to z
are permissible (e.g., violating p).
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The move attempted in the objection is to make possible some overdetermination with
respect to p, but not enough to trivialize p. If successful, this move would, for example,
effectively permit x and y to justify violating p, but would not permit z from simultaneously
justifying a violation of p. It is helpful to think of the constraints as thresholds, and Figure 1 is
helpful in illustrating the relations:
Figure 1
Duty

p-Affecting Status

z

non-affecting
TRIVIALIZABILITY CONSTRAINT

x

affecting

y

affecting

Above the constraint, which is rightly conceived and effectively illustrated as a threshold,
no duties normatively affect p. Beneath the constraint threshold, duties can normatively affect p,
even overdetermining the justification for violating p.144 Because of the near-trivializability
constraint, however, our scale must include a secondary threshold, as represented in Figure 2.
Suppose now that z remains above the trivializability threshold, which entails that it does
not affect the justification for p. Unfortunately for x and y, while they did fall below the
trivializability threshold, they would (if they affected p) justify an agent in treating or regarding p
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Because specifying where the threshold ‘begins’ is a matter of specifying the total set of
sufficient conditions for trivializability, and because this essay focuses on only one sufficient
condition, no more will be said about the finer details of the constraint in regards to a scale as
represented in Figure 1.
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as nearly morally inconsequential. Thus, they fall above the near-trivializability constraint, and
therefore do not affect the justification for p.
Figure 2
Duty

p-Affecting Status

z

non-affecting
TRIVIALIZABILITY CONSTRAINT

x

non-affecting

y

non-affecting
NEAR-TRIVIALIZABILITY CONSTRAINT

a

affecting

b

affecting

A proponent of SD2 might and should accept this scale. No duty can affect the
justification for p if its doing so would either trivialize p or nearly trivialize p. The trouble is with
“nearness,” which is a paradigmatic example of an essentially vague predicate, or a predicate
which essentially admits of vague cases. Figure 2 represents a and b as being duties which
normatively effect p, but not in a way that would objectively justify any agent in regarding the
violation of p as nearly morally inconsequential. Yet among the duties which would pro tanto
require violating p (or would pro tanto require further violating p), there are some duties which
are metaphysically indeterminate with respect to affecting p, as represented in Figure 3.
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Figure 3
Duty

p-Affecting Status

x

non-affecting

y

non-affecting

c

non-affecting(?)

NEAR-TRIVIALIZABILITY CONSTRAINT

c

affecting(?)

a

affecting

b

affecting

Some duties are weighty enough that they will nearly trivialize p. Others are weak
enough that they will be considerably distant from trivializing p. And still other duties will be
borderline cases: it will be neither true nor false that they trivialize p. This occurs in ordinary
cases of nearness. If two objects are within half an inch of each other, they are near each other. If
they are a mile away from each other, they are not near each other. But it is indeterminate
whether they are near each other if they are, say, sixteen feet away from each other.
To think of it with a somewhat more extended analogy, suppose you were asked to
determine whether two objects, O1 and O2, were near one another. They begin two feet apart,
and you confirm that they are near one another. Suppose that at twenty feet, you claim that the
objects are now no longer near each other. If the objects were moved half an inch closer to each
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other, would they be near each other? There is a point at which it is neither true nor false that the
objects are near each other.
Because duty c is a similarly borderline case, it might be represented as either affecting or
non-affecting with respect to p. Of course, it cannot be the case that c both affects p and fails to
affect p, since the law of excluded middle holds for whether c is duty-affective with respect to p.
Yet as an indeterminate case, it would do just that. Such a status is logically impossible (since
excluded middle holds) and, therefore, it is impossible for there to exist such indeterminate
cases. But as a matter of conditional necessity, there are such cases if there is a neartrivializability constraint and if any duties whatsoever normatively affect p: some will affect p,
some will not, and still others (the borderline cases) will do neither.
A final objection bears similarity to the last objection. There exists a view, much like the
one defended here, which concedes the impossibility of trivializing self-defensive assault. But
unlike the view defended here, this alternate view denies that Constraint 1 rules out
overdetermination. The view is similarly motivated. (Trivializability appears impossible;
therefore, it is impossible. If self-defensive assault is permissible at all, then overdetermined selfdefensive assault is possible.) But this, the alternate view might argue, does not rule out
overdetermination, even massive or infinite overdetermination. Rather, it rules out trivializing
overdetermination, including trivializing massive and infinite overdetermination. In effect, no
matter how severely the duty to self-defensive assault is overdetermined, it remains impossible to
trivialize assaulting persons.145

145

Bekka Williams suggested this alternate view and raised it as an objection in conversation.
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The alternate view’s deficit concerns the implausibility of maintaining that the
trivializability constraint, particularly Constraint 1, is necessarily unaffected by the various
relations there are, including overdetermination. The truth of Constraint 1 fails to rule out as
impossible any actual (or merely logically possible) relations, but it rules out certain relations
which, absent Constraint 1, would be possible. Think of this in terms of moral theory. Some
moral theories do not include Constraint 1, whereas others do. Of those that do not, certain moral
relations, like trivializability-by-overdetermination, are maintained to be possible. Thus,
Constraint 1 implies that some moral theories are false.
Now consider an analogy. Suppose it is claimed that the act of rotating a ceramic penguin
to the slight annoyance of a friend cannot be committed in a morally casual way. Against this, it
is reasonably argued that such an act can surely be done with moral ease. After all, if rotating the
penguin is all that is required to prevent every catastrophe in the world (every war, every labored
and asthmatic breath), surely some agent would be objectively justified in rotating the penguin
without a second thought. The evidential basis for inferring trivializability is apparent: massive
overdetermination. This is evidence for the conclusion that Constraint 1 is sensitive to
overdetermination in the following way: overdetermination is sufficient for trivializability. But
that is just what the defender of the alternate view denies. Thus, the alternate view is false.
5. Conclusion
For various reasons, some believe and defend a particular thesis about self-defense,
namely:
SELF-DEFENSE 2:

Acts of self-defense are (pro tanto) morally required.
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Here it was argued that SD2 is false in virtue of an untoward modal implication: that the
presumptive duty against assaulting a person can be overridden or undermined so as to justify an
act of self-defense, and that the duties which ground the duty to self-defensive assault can
overdetermine the justification for self-defensive assault. Such overdetermination is impossible
for duties for which there is a trivializability constraint, and there is just such a constraint for the
presumptive duty against assaulting persons. As SD2 implies that there is some possible world in
which the presumptive no-assault duty is trivialized and there is no such world, SD2 is
necessarily false.
Against this, it was argued that the argument from trivializability itself permits advocates
of SD2 to reject trivializing overdetermination while accepting overdetermination. But this is
implausible because at least for the presumptive duty against assaulting persons, there is also an
almost-trivializability constraint, and that constraint forces the defender of SD2 to claim that
there are metaphysically indeterminate cases of the following sort: some duty, x, neither
normatively requires self-defense nor fails to require self-defense. Since every duty necessarily
does one or the other, this is impossible, and thus there can be no duties which normatively
require self-defense. Plausibly, this is because self-defense is not the sort of thing that can be
required because it is absolutely wrong.
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CONCLUSION

This essay addressed the moral permissibility of self-defensive assault. All cases of selfdefensive assault involve a Defender and a Threat. The following provisional account of assault
was defended:
Defender assaults Threat at time t if and only if Defender intentionally and directly
brings about some state of affairs C in which a fully-informed Threat would have
conclusive prudential reason to escape C if Threat aims to protect Threat’s organism and
if no other C-type circumstance would result if Threat attempted to escape C.
Self-defensive assault is a threat to Threat’s organism. These threats might be
intentionally brought about (as in cases where Defender personally or directly attacks or inflicts
harm on Threat) or intentionally permitted to be brought about (as in cases where Defender
impersonally or indirectly hires a hit-man to kill Threat or directs Threat to a dangerous area with
the plan that Threat will be assaulted).
This essay was exclusively concerned with self-defensive assault and no other potential
justifications for assault.146 Thus, other-defense, punishment, prevention of catastrophe and other
evils, and non-domestic grounds for initiating or engaging in warfare were excluded from full
consideration. It was maintained, however, that whether there is a right to self-defense plausibly
has implications for each of these other attempts at justifying assault.
The first chapter, “Theories of Self-Defense,” offered a workable definition of assault,
reviewed eliminativist and non-eliminativist theories of justified self-defensive assault, and
showed that certain eliminativist theories can with internal consistency oppose all assault. It was
also argued in that chapter that the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) is both friend and foe to
146

The exception occurred in Chapter 3 in which all possible moral considerations which might
make self-defensive assault obligatory were refuted.
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such theories, as such theories require DDE to maintain coherence but this acceptance of DDE
must be cautious insofar as DDE has been sometimes supposed to offer justification for
assaulting persons. One response for eliminativists is to avail themselves of the principle that it is
wrong, always, everywhere, and for anyone, to intend acts which have as their effects some
absolute wrong when those acts can be avoided merely by failing to intend them. This escape
route was then defended from putative counterexamples.
The second chapter, “Against Merely Permissible Self-Defense,” defended eliminativism
against the thesis that acts of self-defensive assault are morally permissible but not morally
obligatory. It was shown that the broad literature on self-defensive theories supports certain
requirements for permissible self-defense, including proportionality and necessity. Regarding
necessity, it was argued that for an act of self-defensive assault to be permissibly employed
against a person, assault must be the only reasonably accessible and permissible means to
achieve the end of preserving oneself from harm. But in addition to this means-selection
principle, it was argued that there are likewise applicable end-selection foreseen-effects-selection
principles. According to those principles, it is wrong to choose an end requiring assault as a
means when the selection of some other end, an end not requiring assault as a means, is
permissible to choose; and it is wrong to choose an act with the foreseen effect that a person will
be assaulted when there is some distinct act without such an effect which would be permissible
to choose. Because allowing oneself to be harmed is always a right of persons and that is always
a permissible option for persons to choose, persons ought to choose it. Thus, there is no merely
permissible self-defensive assault such that if self-defensive assault is permissible, it is also
obligatory.
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The third and final argumentative chapter, “Against Obligatory Self-Defense,” defended
the thesis that acts of self-defensive assault are not morally obligatory. On some theories of selfdefense, such as justice-based theories, there is conceptual room to argue that self-defensive
assault is obligatory since in circumstances where either Defender or Threat will bear the cost of
Threat’s unjust assault on Defender, it is uniquely just to require Threat to bear that cost. On
such views, because assaulting Threat in self-defense is the only way of making Threat bear that
cost, assaulting Threat in self-defense is obligatory. It was the argued that there exists a
trivializability constraint for certain duties with the result that, if those duties cannot be morally
trivialized (that is, if no possible agent would be objectively justified in regarding the violation of
those duties as inconsequential), then certain justifying relations are impossible for the relevant
acts. In particular, overdetermination is impossible in cases of justification for violation of a nontrivializable duty. Because one’s (alleged) duty to self-defend can necessarily be overdetermined,
even massively or infinitely so, it follows that if there is a trivializability constraint for acts of
assault on persons, then there is no duty to self-defend. As there is such a constraint, there is no
duty to self-defend.
The latter chapters imply a dilemma for non-eliminativists about self-defense: if selfdefense is permissible on any occasion, it is either permissible but not obligatory or permissible
and obligatory. But, as argued in Chapter 2, self-defensive assault cannot be merely permissible,
because that would sanction, among other things, intentionally causing unnecessary harm. As
argued in Chapter 3, self-defensive assault cannot be obligatory, because there is a trivializability
constraint regarding self-defensive assault which implies that such assault is absolutely
prohibited, and that which is morally prohibited cannot simultaneously be morally required.
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In conclusion, there are no permissible acts of self-defensive assault against persons, and
therefore eliminativism about justified self-defensive assault is true. This conclusion is
unorthodox and radical. Indeed, nearly no one defends it. But that does not show that it is false,
although it does perhaps provide a presumption against the truth of eliminativism. The purpose
of this essay was to offer reasons against that presumption and to offer a limited defense of
eliminativism. That much has now been accomplished.
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